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ARE THE SEC’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES
BIASED? AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION
Urska Velikonja *
Abstract: The Dodd-Frank Act significantly expanded the SEC’s enforcement flexibility
by authorizing the agency to choose whether to bring an enforcement action in court or in an
administrative proceeding. The change has faced strong opposition. Federal courts have
enjoined several enforcement actions filed in administrative proceedings for constitutional
infirmities, and cases are currently winding their way through the appellate process. But even
if any constitutional problems were remedied, controversy would persist. Judges, lawmakers,
practitioners, and academics have raised doubts as to whether litigation before administrative
law judges (“ALJs”) is fair to defendants. In advancing their arguments, they have relied
heavily on a series of reports published in the Wall Street Journal purporting to show that the
SEC enjoys a home-court advantage in litigation before ALJs.
As documented in this Article, the evidence offered by the Wall Street Journal is
deficient and its conclusions unfounded. This Article compiles and analyzes a large dataset of
all enforcement actions filed in fiscal years 2007 to 2015. Contrary to the claim advanced by
the Wall Street Journal and critics of administrative adjudication, SEC litigation before ALJs
remains rare. Although the number of contested actions filed in the administrative forum has
increased since Dodd-Frank, this is mostly due to an increase in actions that could have been
litigated before ALJs prior to the Dodd-Frank amendment. More significantly, there is no
robust correlation between the selected forum and case outcome. Federal district court judges
ruled for the SEC and against defendants in 88% of cases, whereas ALJs ruled for the SEC in
90% of cases. This finding does not imply that the type of forum in which the SEC litigates
does not matter. Rather, there are significant empirical obstacles to finding any useful results
by comparing case outcomes.
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INTRODUCTION
In August 2013, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)
celebrated a confidence-boosting victory after a jury trial of the
“Fabulous Fab,” Goldman Sachs’s trader Fabrice Tourre, who was found
liable for defrauding investors in mortgage securities. 1 A series of
stinging trial defeats for the SEC followed that victory. First, Mark
Cuban prevailed after a much-publicized insider-trading jury trial. 2 Soon
afterwards, over the course of four months, the SEC lost at trial again
and again. 3 Around the same time, the SEC’s then-new Enforcement
1. See Justin Baer, Chad Bray & Jean Eaglesham, ‘Fab’ Trader Liable in Fraud, WALL ST. J.
(Aug. 2, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323681904578641843284450004
[https://perma.cc/A98Q-X6XU] (reporting that the victory produced “happiness around the halls” of
the SEC).
2. See Andrew Harris & Tom Korosec, SEC Loses as Mark Cuban Triumphs in Insider-Trading
Trial, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 18, 2013, 1:48 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-1016/billionaire-mark-cuban-found-not-liable-in-sec-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/ED22-R62J].
3. Between December 2, 2013 and January 27, 2014, the SEC lost against eight defendants
charged with insider trading and accounting fraud. See SEC v. Steffes et al., No. 1:10-cv-6266
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 27, 2014); SEC v. Schvacho, No. 1:12-cv-2557 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 7, 2014); SEC v.
Jensen & Tekulve, No. 2:11-cv-5316 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2013); SEC v. Kovzan, No. 2:11-cv-2017
(D. Kan. Dec. 2, 2013). Between October 2013 and the end of January 2014, the SEC lost at trial
against nine of fourteen defendants. One of these cases was appealed and remanded, so, at the end,
the SEC’s track record for the period may be less grim than initially reported. By contrast, at trials
concluded between February 2014 and the end of February 2016, the SEC lost against only three of
thirty-five defendants. Data on file with author.
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Director announced that the agency would file more enforcement actions
in the administrative forum instead of in federal district court. 4 Coming
on the heels of trial losses, the change in policy looked like an
opportunistic search for a more favorable adjudicator. Contemporaneous
news articles and commentary insinuated that the SEC was motivated by
“home-court advantage,” 5 and speculated that administrative law judges
(“ALJs”), who decide cases filed in the administrative forum, were
biased in favor of the agency. 6
The change in enforcement policy was possible because of a
provision included in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010. 7 Section 929P(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act
authorized the SEC to seek fines from any firm or individual in an
administrative proceeding. 8 Before the amendment, the SEC could
impose fines in administrative proceedings only on registered firms and
individuals, such as broker-dealers, investment advisers, and firms that
registered securities with the agency. 9 But the SEC had to sue in federal
district court to secure fines against non-registered firms and
individuals—public companies and executive officers charged with
accounting fraud; traders charged with insider trading violations; and
those charged with selling unregistered securities, including most Ponzi
schemers. 10
Initially, expanding the jurisdiction of ALJs, who decide cases filed in
the administrative forum, did not raise eyebrows. 11 Few recognized the
amendment’s full potential and the SEC was reluctant to use it.12 As the
SEC started filing more actions in the administrative forum, defendants’

4. Gretchen Morgenson, At the SEC, a Question of Home-Court Edge, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/06/business/at-the-sec-a-question-of-home-courtedge.html [https://perma.cc/X8MC-GY63].
5. Id.
6. In the alternative, more restrained commentators suggested that even if ALJs were not biased,
procedural rules in administrative proceedings disadvantaged respondents. See William McLucas &
Matthew Martens, How to Rein in the SEC, WALL ST. J. (June 2, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/how-to-rein-in-the-sec-1433285747 [https://perma.cc/73CH-GA28].
7. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
8. See Dodd-Frank Act § 929P(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 1862.
9. See Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101429.
10. See discussion infra section I.A.
11. See discussion infra section I.A.
12. See discussion infra section II.B.
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objections and public unease began to mount. 13 They culminated in a
front-page report published in the Wall Street Journal. 14 The news story,
based on an analysis of outcomes in SEC enforcement actions over
several years, reported that securities defendants were considerably more
likely to lose when the SEC sued them in the administrative forum than
when it sued them in court. 15 The story purported to offer empirical
validation for the claims that ALJs were biased in favor of the SEC, and
accused the SEC of steering weaker cases to the administrative forum. 16
The news story attracted almost immediate responses by federal
judges, 17 practitioners, 18 advocates, 19 academics, 20 and the press. 21
Defendants have cited the reported figures in lawsuits that sought to
enjoin SEC enforcement actions filed in the administrative forum,
arguing that the administrative forum gave the Enforcement Division
“an unfair advantage.” 22 One federal judge said that these arguments
were “compelling and meritorious,” 23 and another added, quoting the
13. See Urska Velikonja, Securities Settlements in the Shadows, 126 YALE L.J. F. 124 (2016);
Morgenson, supra note 4 (quoting SEC enforcement director Andrew Ceresney as saying that the
SEC “will be bringing more administrative proceedings given the recent statutory changes”).
14. Jean Eaglesham, SEC Is Steering More Trials to Judges It Appoints, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 21,
2014),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-is-steering-more-trials-to-judges-it-appoints-1413849590
[https://perma.cc/6WGY-2XS2] (reporting that in fiscal years 2012 and 2013 the SEC prevailed in
90% and 100% of trials before ALJs, respectively, and in 75% and 63% of trials in court,
respectively).
15. Id.
16. See id.
17. See, e.g., Jed. S. Rakoff, Address at the PLI Securities Regulation Institute: Is the S.E.C.
Becoming a Law Unto Itself? (Nov. 5, 2014), https://securitiesdiary.files.wordpress.com/2014/11/
rakoff-pli-speech.pdf [https://perma.cc/277Q-YF53] [hereinafter Rakoff Address].
18. See, e.g., McLucas & Martens, supra note 6.
19. See, e.g., Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness, Comment Letter on Proposed
Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice—17 CFR Part 201 (Dec. 4, 2015),
http://www.centerforcapitalmarkets.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/021882_SEC_Reform_FIN1.
pdf [https://perma.cc/W6AR-QDJS].
20. Rachel E. Barkow, Overseeing Agency Enforcement, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1129, 1160–61
(2016); Kent Barnett, Against Administrative Judges, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1643, 1645 (2016);
Gideon Mark, SEC Enforcement Discretion, 94 TEX. L. REV. 261 (2016); see also David Zaring,
Enforcement Discretion at the SEC, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1115, 1158 (2016).
21. See, e.g., Jean Eaglesham, Federal Judge Rules SEC In-House Judge’s Appointment ‘Likely
Unconstitutional,’ WALL ST. J. (June 8, 2015, 4:50 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/federal-judgerules-sec-in-house-judges-appointment-likely-unconstitutional-1433796161 [https://perma.cc/TG6Q
-LBAC]; Jenna Greene, The SEC’s on a Long Winning Streak, NAT’L L.J. (Jan. 22, 2015),
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202715464297/The-SECs-On-a-Long-Winning-Streak
[https://perma.cc/TG6Q-LBAC].
22. Douglas Davison, Matthew Martens, Nicole Rabner, Natalie Rastin & John Valentine,
Litigating with—and at—the SEC, 48 THE REV. OF SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 103, 103 (2015).
23. Bebo v. SEC, No. 15-cv-3, 2015 WL 905349, at *2 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 3, 2015).
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Wall Street Journal figures, that litigation before ALJs was “unfair to the
litigants.” 24 The SEC’s inspector general has conducted an investigation
into whether ALJs are biased. 25 Even academic commentators, who are
usually skeptical of news reporting, have taken the news articles at face
value and relied on them to support their analysis.26 Relying on the Wall
Street Journal reporting, two bills have been introduced in Congress to
reduce the perceived procedural and substantive bias in administrative
securities enforcement. 27 The SEC, under significant and sustained
pressure to change its enforcement practices, recently amended
procedural rules that govern litigation before ALJs. 28 Although the
amendments to the SEC’s Rules of Practice substantially expand
defendants’ procedural rights in administrative proceedings, the critics
of its enforcement program demand more by continuing to invoke the
purported disparity in outcomes. 29
That empirical support would influence the debate about a
controversial statute is laudable—assuming that the data are
24. Rakoff Address, supra note 17, at 11.
25. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., SEC, INTERIM REPORT OF INVESTIGATION CASE # 15-ALJ0482-I 4 (2015), https://www.sec.gov/oig/reportspubs/ oig-sec-interim-report-investigation-adminlaw-judges.pdf [https://perma.cc/KG9L-HX2Q] (finding no evidence of bias).
26. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 20, at 1160−61; Mark, supra note 20, at 261–62.
27. In the press release announcing the bill, the proponent of the first bill relied heavily and
explicitly on the Wall Street Journal reporting to justify the amendments. Peter J. Henning, SEC
Victories Delay Challenge on In-House Judges, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/06/business/dealbook/sec-victories-delay-challenge-on-in-housejudges.html [https://perma.cc/29Z9-MV43]; Press Release, U.S. Congressman Scott Garrett, Garrett
Introduces Bill to Restore Due Process Rights for All Americans (Oct. 22, 2015),
https://garrett.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/garrett-introduces-bill-to-restore-due-processrights-for-all-americans [https://perma.cc/V85E-5442] [hereinafter Garrett Press Release].
28. See Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 81 Fed. Reg. 50,212 (July 29, 2016)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 201) https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2016/34-78319.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UM2B-TNCU]. Half of the comment letters on the proposed amendments to the
SEC’s Rules of Practice cited the Wall Street Journal news story to contend that securities
defendants sued in administrative proceeding “lose substantially more frequently than do defendants
in federal court.” See, e.g., Susan E. Brune, Brune & Richard LLP, Comment Letter on Proposed
Rule on Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice (File No. S7-18-15) (Nov. 23, 2015),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-18-15/s71815-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3AS-8FGK].
29. See Bradley J. Bondi, Sara E. Ortiz & Michael Wheatley, Cahill Discusses SEC’s
Amendments to Rules of Practice for Administrative Proceedings, COLUM. L. SCH.: CLS BLUE SKY
BLOG (July 21, 2016), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2016/07/21/cahill-discusses-secsamendments-to-rules-of-practice-for-administrative-proceedings/ [https://perma.cc/GG3J-3NZM]
(“It remains to be seen whether these amendments will impact the statistical disparity . . . .”);
Kimberley A. Strassel, The SEC Plays Judge and Jury, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 4, 2016),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-sec-plays-judge-and-jury-1470353410
[https://perma.cc/5PVDRG34] (opining that the SEC “loves” to litigate before ALJs because it is more likely to win, citing
to the Wall Street Journal report).
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representative and the analysis thorough and correct. Unfortunately, the
evidence that most critics of ALJ adjudication cite is misleading in
important respects. This Article is the first to collect and analyze all
enforcement actions filed over a relatively long period of time: it
reviews enforcement actions filed between fiscal years 2007 and 2015
against 10,967 defendants. 30 Using the collected data, the Article tests
two related claims that the Wall Street Journal and the critics of
administrative adjudication have advanced: first, whether the SEC is
steering more contested cases to administrative proceedings, and second,
whether the SEC is more likely to prevail in cases decided by ALJs.
As to the first claim, the Article reports evidence that the SEC has
been litigating more in administrative proceedings since the adoption the
Dodd-Frank Act. 31 Not all of the increase is attributable to expanded
jurisdiction of ALJs; about half of the increase is due to the fact that the
SEC has recently brought more actions that could have been filed in
administrative proceedings even before the Dodd-Frank amendment. As
to the second claim, the difference in outcomes is largely the result of
the different nature of cases filed in each type of forum. The SEC is
considerably less likely to prevail against a defendant sued for insider
trading and accounting fraud regardless of forum. These cases are also
considerably less likely to be filed in the administrative forum. As a
result, a comparison of success rates by venue that does not control for
the subject matter of the action will understate the SEC’s success in
court and overstate its success in the administrative forum. In addition,
the news stories to date compared outcomes after trial. 32 But most SEC
cases decided by a judge are resolved by summary judgment. 33 After one
controls for the subject matter, or once one includes cases decided by
dispositive motions and not only after trial, the reported disparity in
outcomes disappears. 34 In fact, the only way to reproduce the Wall Street
Journal win-ratios is to compare outcomes after trial and on motion to
30. The only other serious academic effort to evaluate case outcomes has been made by Professor
Grundfest, though with a considerably more limited set of data. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Fair or
Foul? SEC Administrative Proceedings and Prospects for Reform Through Removal Legislation, 85
FORDHAM L. REV. 1143, 1143 (2016).
31. See discussion infra section II.B.
32. See, e.g., Morgenson, supra note 4 (noting that the SEC prevailed in “7.5 out of 12” cases
litigated in district court). The SEC prevailed against 59 defendants sued in 2011 (data on file with
author), suggesting that the figure reported by the New York Times does not include summary
judgments. See also Grundfest, supra note 30, at 1178 (implying that the Wall Street Journal reports
did not include summary judgments in their analysis).
33. See infra Table 3.
34. See discussion infra section II.C.
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dismiss, but exclude cases resoloved by summary judgment. In short, the
Wall Street Journal compared apples to oranges.
The results reported in this Article are significant because of the
substantial influence that the Wall Street Journal’s reporting has had and
may continue to have on the law and practice of securities enforcement.
At the same time, the results reported in this Article should not be
understood to imply that the type of forum does not matter in securities
enforcement. Rather, the information that is available on enforcement
actions does not allow one to draw useful empirical conclusions
regarding the relationship between forum choice and case outcome. The
controversy surrounding administrative adjudication will no doubt
continue after this Article, but hopefully not on the basis of discredited
empirical evidence.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the legal
background of the Dodd-Frank amendment, the difference in procedural
rules in court and before ALJs, and the related constitutional and
empirical challenges. Part II uses a complete dataset of enforcement
actions filed between 2007 and 2015 to assess two claims: first, that the
reported increase in the cases filed in administrative proceedings is due
largely to contested litigation before ALJs; and second, that ALJs are
more likely to rule for the SEC than federal judges. The Article finds
only limited support for the first claim and none for the second. Part III
discusses the implications of the results. Significantly, because of
omitted and unobservable variables, as well as selection bias, the result
should not be interpreted to suggest that the forum makes no difference.
Rather, the data in this space is not useful to resolve what is at its core a
public relations problem for the SEC. It is nevertheless important to
correct the record because the Wall Street Journal’s study has been so
influential since its publication. The Article concludes with a caveat
regarding greater use of empirical scholarship in policymaking. As the
influence of big data increases, so should our concern about the quality
of the data and the analysis. The significant impact of the Wall Street
Journal’s flawed reporting provides a cautionary tale.
I.

LEGAL CHANGE AND THE RELATED CONTROVERSY

This Part sets the stage for the empirical analysis that follows in Part
II. It explains the legal background and the significance of the DoddFrank amendment, outlines the procedural differences between the two
different types of forums, and concludes with a discussion of the
constitutional and empirical challenges raised against adjudication by
ALJs.
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The Legal Change

The Dodd-Frank Act included hundreds of new legal provisions.
Some of them, like the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau and the Volcker Rule, attracted considerable political, media,
and academic attention at the time they were adopted.35 Others did not.
Section 929P(a) was one of those sections that few (outside of a small
group of securities lawyers) paid attention to at the time. The legislative
history for the amendment is remarkably sparse. Robert Khuzami, the
SEC’s then-Director of Enforcement submitted a ten-page statement to
the Senate Judiciary Committee in support of Dodd-Frank, and he
devoted a single sentence to what would become section 929P(a):
“[a]dditional legislative proposals that would serve to enhance the
Division’s effectiveness and efficiency include the ability to seek civil
penalties in cease-and-desist proceedings.” 36 The only legislative history
of section 929P(a) in the House Report on Dodd-Frank states that “[t]his
section streamlines the SEC’s existing enforcement authorities by
permitting the SEC to seek civil money penalties in cease-and-desist
proceedings under Federal securities laws.” 37
Historically, the SEC could seek to enjoin or to stop violations of
securities laws but could not seek monetary sanctions. During the 1970s,
the SEC began to seek disgorgement of ill-gotten gain as an ancillary
equitable remedy, 38 but it did not have the right to seek fines until
1984. 39 The Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform
Act of 1990 (“Reform Act”) expanded the SEC’s penalty authority. 40
The Reform Act empowered the SEC to seek fines in administrative
proceedings against entities and individuals registered with the SEC,
including broker-dealers, investment advisers, and firms that registered
35. See, e.g., Helene Cooper, Obama Signs Overhaul of Financial System, N.Y. TIMES (July 22,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/22/business/22regulate.html [https://perma.cc/Z2YKWZP2].
36. Mortgage Fraud, Securities Fraud, and the Financial Meltdown: Prosecuting Those
Responsible: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of
Robert Khuzami, Dir., Div. of Enf’t, SEC), https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2009/ts120909
rk.htm [https://perma.cc/YG4K-4SYL].
37. H.R. REP. No. 111-687, § 211, at 78 (2009), https://www.congress.gov/111/crpt/hrpt687/
CRPT-111hrpt687-pt1.pdf [https://perma.cc/GZ5E-CWV5].
38. See Verity Winship, Fair Funds and the SEC’s Compensation of Injured Investors, 60 FLA. L.
REV. 1103, 1111–12 (2008).
39. The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 empowered the SEC to seek civil fines in insider
trading cases. See Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78u-l(b)(l)(A)).
40. Pub. L. No. 101-429 (1990).
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securities with the agency. 41 But in order to secure fines against nonregistered firms and individuals, the SEC had to sue them in court. For
example, the SEC sued WorldCom in court for accounting fraud and
obtained a $750-million fine; 42 likewise the SEC sued Angelo Mozilo in
court for securities fraud and secured the “largest-ever financial penalty
against a public company’s senior executive.” 43
Section 929P(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act authorizes the SEC to seek
civil penalties in an administrative cease-and-desist proceeding against
any person who is found to have violated federal securities laws. 44 The
new provision allows the SEC to resolve almost any enforcement action
in an administrative proceeding, but it does not eliminate the SEC’s
authority to litigate in court.45 As a result, the SEC can exercise
discretion in choosing where to file any enforcement action, 46 except for
actions in which the SEC seeks remedies that only courts or ALJs can
impose. 47 When an agency can choose the forum, it will usually litigate
where it is more cost-effective to do so. 48
Considerable procedural differences between adjudication in court
and in an administrative proceeding are discussed in more detail below.
Respondents—as defendants in administrative proceedings are called—
face a time-compressed schedule as compared with litigation in court,
41. Id.
42. Press Release, SEC, The Honorable Jed Rakoff Approves Settlement of SEC’s Claim for a
Civil Penalty Against WorldCom (July 7, 2003), https://www.sec.gov/news/ press/2003-81.htm
[https://perma.cc/6XMG-PGWT].
43. Press Release, SEC, Former Countrywide CEO Angelo Mozilo to Pay SEC’s Largest-Ever
Financial Penalty Against a Public Company’s Senior Executive (Oct. 15, 2010),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-197.htm [https://perma.cc/F5Z6-WK3H].
44. 124 Stat. 1862 (2010). A cease-and-desist proceeding is an administrative proceeding seeking
to order the respondent to cease and desist violating securities laws. The court equivalent is an
injunctive proceeding in which the SEC seeks an obey-the-law injunction.
45. See Dodd-Frank § 929P(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 1862. The section expands the jurisdiction of ALJs
without amending other provisions relating to venue.
46. Andrew Ceresney, the former director of the SEC Enforcement Division explained that
“Congress provided us authority to obtain penalties in administrative proceedings against
unregistered parties comparable to those we already could obtain from registered persons.” Andrew
Ceresney, Dir., Div. of Enf’t, SEC, Remarks to the American Bar Association’s Business Law
Section
Fall
Meeting
(Nov.
21,
2014),
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/
Speech/1370543515297 [https://perma.cc/V4P6-77ZB] [hereinafter Ceresney, ABA Remarks].
47. For example, only a court can order a clawback under section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
while an associational or professional bar can be ordered only in administrative proceedings.
48. See Andrew Ceresney, Dir., Div. of Enf’t, SEC, Keynote Speech at New York City Bar 4th
Annual White Collar Institute (May 12, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ceresney-nyc-bar4th-white-collar-key-note.html [https://perma.cc/97ZV-LYJH]. The SEC is far from the only
agency that can seek monetary penalties in an administrative proceeding: so can the FTC, the
OSHA, banking regulators, etc.
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and they have fewer procedural protections. 49 Different rules have given
rise to constitutional objections and, more recently, to empirical claims
that respondents are at a disadvantage when forced to defend themselves
in administrative proceedings. 50 The following sections discuss these
developments in turn.
B.

Procedural Differences

The SEC has plenary enforcement authority over violations of federal
securities laws. 51 In court, the Commission is authorized to seek
monetary penalties, disgorgement, clawbacks, injunctions, officer and
director bars, and an assortment of equitable remedies. 52 In an
administrative forum, the agency can seek monetary penalties and
disgorgement, cease-and-desist orders (which are similar to injunctions),
as well as officer and director bars, various bars from working in the
securities industry, and bars from appearing before the Commission as
auditor or attorney. 53 The overlap in remedies is not perfect, but in most
enforcement actions the Commission can “obtain many . . . of the same
remedies in administrative proceedings as [it] could get in district
court.” 54
An administrative proceeding differs from in-court litigation in
several respects. In settled actions filed in the administrative forum,
ALJs are not involved at all: the Enforcement Division proposes a
settlement and the Commission (i.e., the sitting commissioners)
approves the settlement by issuing the order instituting proceedings
(“OIP”), making findings, and imposing sanctions. 55 By contrast, settled
actions filed in federal district court must be approved first by the
Commission and then by a judge in order to become effective. 56
Procedural rules differ more significantly in contested actions as
compared with settled actions, though the difference can easily be
49. See discussion infra in section I.B.
50. See, e.g., Morgenson, supra note 4; Eaglesham, supra note 14.
51. 15 U.S.C. § 77t(a), (b) (2012) (“Whenever it shall appear to the Commission [that] any rule
or regulation . . . have been or are about to be violated, it . . . may investigate such facts.” (emphasis
added)).
52. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u–78u-1 (2012).
53. Id. §§ 78u-2–78u-3.
54. Ceresney, ABA Remarks, supra note 46.
55. See, e.g., Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 78291, 2016 WL 4363820
(July 12, 2016) (order instituting public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings, making
findings, and imposing remedial sanctions and a cease-and-desist order).
56. See Velikonja, supra note 13, at 128.
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overstated. 57 Formal administrative adjudication at the SEC is governed
by the Administrative Procedure Act and the SEC’s Rules of Practice. 58
Internal rules provide that ALJs conduct hearings “in a manner similar to
non-jury trials in the federal district courts.” 59 ALJs receive career
appointments, not unlike federal judges. 60 At a high level of generality,
proceedings before ALJs are similar to judicial adjudication. 61 The
parties have the opportunity to submit briefs and to propose findings of
fact and conclusions of law. 62 After a hearing, the ALJ prepares a
written decision that can be appealed to the Commission. 63
But the devil is in the details. A defendant in federal district court has
the right to full civil discovery and adjudication by an independent
Article III judge, and the procedure is governed by the Federal Rules of
Evidence and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.64 A defendant sued
in court is usually entitled to a jury trial, though more often than not, the
SEC’s civil actions are resolved by summary judgment, not by a jury. 65
Judges who preside over cases heard in court are completely
independent from the agency. Significantly, judges are also better
positioned to dispatch “wholesale rebukes of agencies” and are less
constrained by “bureaucratic regularity” than ALJs. 66

57. SEC ALJs enjoy many of the powers that trial judges have. 5 U.S.C. §§ 556–57. But see
Sarah N. Lynch, SEC to File Some Insider-Trading Cases in Its In-House Court, REUTERS (June 11,
2014) http://www.reuters.com/article/us-sec-insidertrading-idUSKBN0EM2DI20140611 [https://
perma.cc/Y64E-BU6Y] (quoting one defendant’s charge that the administrative proceedings at the
SEC are a “kangaroo court”).
58. 17 C.F.R. § 201 (2012).
59. U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES
(2016), https://www.sec.gov/alj [https://perma.cc/4D82-K2DW].
60. 5 C.F.R. § 930.204(a) (2012). Grounds for removal of ALJs who are civil servants are
broader than for federal judges, who can only be removed by impeachment.
61. See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 744 (2002) (“[T]he role
of the ALJ is similar to that of an Article III judge . . . .”); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513
(1978) (“[T]he role of the modern . . . administrative law judge . . . is ‘functionally comparable’ to
that of a judge.”).
62. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.340 (2012).
63. Id. § 201.360. Of cases analyzed in this Article, 56 were appealed to the Commission. The
Commission affirmed the Initial Decision without changes in 29 cases (52%); it reduced sanctions
in 17 cases (30%), including dismissing charges in 3 cases; and it increased sanctions in 10 cases
(18%), including finding liability and imposing sanctions in 4 cases that ALJs had dismissed.
64. FED. R. EVID. 1101; FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
65. See discussion infra section II.B.
66. Zaring, supra note 20, at 1217 (using United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014),
as an example for a broad equitable decision).
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By contrast, ALJs are SEC employees. There is no jury. ALJs follow
the rules of administrative procedure and have no equitable authority. 67
ALJs can hear “[a]ny oral or documentary evidence” 68 except for
evidence that is “irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious.” 69
Hearsay evidence is more easily admissible in proceedings before ALJs
than in court. 70 Defendants can submit only a limited number of
depositions in litigation before an ALJ; they can submit more
depositions in court. 71 Some motions, including motions to dismiss,
either were unavailable in administrative proceedings until recently72 or
were available in more limited circumstances than they are in court. 73
Most significantly, the process before ALJs is much quicker than in
court. Mandatory timelines imposed by the SEC’s Rules of Practice
require that in many cases, the entire administrative proceeding be
completed in less than one year. 74 The July 2016 amendments extended
the prehearing period from four to up to ten months. Despite the
extension, the entire timeline before ALJs remains compressed when
compared with court, where the median contested enforcement action
takes an extra five months to resolve. 75 The tight timeline in a
proceeding before an ALJ can be both a bug and a feature for the

67. Administrative adjudication is a creature of statute, whereas courts have equitable authority
arising from the common law. See generally Zaring, supra note 20, at 1216 (observing that when
reviewing agency actions, courts “apply . . . the procedural requirements of the APA” and not
“broad equitable principles”).
68. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2012).
69. 17 C.F.R. § 201.320 (2012).
70. Thomas C. Gonnella, Exchange Act Release No. 1579 (July 2, 2014) (order on motions
in limine), https://www.sec.gov/alj/aljorders/2014/ap-1579.pdf [https://perma.cc/TC4W-ST47]
(providing that “when ‘in doubt,’” about the admissibility of evidence, “the evidence should be
admitted”).
71. See Zaring, supra note 20, at 1167 n.54 (quoting SEC Director of Enforcement Ceresney as
saying that depositions in criminal proceedings are allowed only in “exceptional circumstances”).
72. The amendment to the Rules of Practice adopted in July 2016 authorized either party in an
administrative proceeding to file a motion to dismiss, a motion for summary disposition, and a
motion for a ruling as a matter of law. See Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 81
Fed. Reg. 50,212 (July 29, 2016) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 201).
73. See Alexander I. Platt, Unstacking the Deck: Administrative Summary Judgment and Political
Control (forthcoming 2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2809199 [https://perma.cc/24MG-LDG5]
[hereinafter Platt, Unstacking the Deck].
74. 17 C.F.R. § 201.360(a)(2) (2012).
75. The median ALJ decision is handed down 632 days after filing; the median court decision is
rendered in 767 days. The difference is somewhat larger at the 75th percentile: 972 days for Initial
Decision compared with 1170 days for a court decision. Data on file with author. See also Press
Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Amendments to Rules of Practice for Administrative Proceedings (July
13, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-142.html [https://perma.cc/6J7F-GYZ8].
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respondent. On the one hand, it may be difficult for a respondent to
review the evidence and prepare a defense within the short timeline. 76
On the other hand, once the enforcement action is filed in an
administrative proceeding, the SEC Enforcement Division’s trial lawyers
face the same tight deadlines.77 A longer timeline in court gives the
defendant more time to prepare a defense, but it also extends the period
during which the defendant may not be able to work in the securities
industry because of the ongoing proceedings. 78
There are considerable and important procedural differences between
an SEC administrative proceeding and litigation in federal district court,
but as informed commentators have observed, “those differences do not
always favor the Enforcement Division.” 79 It is certainly not obvious
that the two sets of procedural rules must or should be identical. 80
Respondents in administrative proceedings do enjoy a significant
advantage over those sued in federal court. The SEC’s Rules of Practice
impose a Brady 81 obligation on the Enforcement Division. 82 The
Division must turn over all exculpatory evidence to the respondent
before any hearing in administrative proceeding, but there is no
comparable obligation to defendants the SEC sues in court. 83

76. See Davison et al., supra note 22, at 107.
77. See id. at 108. This is true once the action is filed but perhaps misleading. The Enforcement
Division that conducted the investigation is familiar with all the material it collected, while the
defendant’s lawyer may be familiar with only part of the record from the investigation. See, e.g.,
Harding Advisory LLC & Wing F. Chau, Securities Act Release No. 10277, Investment Company
Act Release No. 32415, 2017 WL 66592 (Jan. 6, 2017).
78. Cf. Judy K. Wolf, Initial Decision Release No. 851, 2015 WL 4639230 (Aug. 5, 2015) (noting
that once Wells Fargo became aware of the SEC investigation, the respondent was placed on
administrative leave, and Wells Fargo subsequently terminated her).
79. Davison et al., supra note 22, at 113.
80. The United States Supreme Court noted in the past that the similarities between adjudication
in court and before ALJs were “overwhelming.” Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535
U.S. 743, 759 (2002).
81. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
82. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.230(a)(1) (2015) (“[T]he Division of Enforcement shall make available
for inspection and copying by any party documents obtained by the Division prior to the institution
of proceedings, in connection with the investigation leading to the Division’s recommendation to
institute proceedings.”).
83. Under the rules of civil discovery, the SEC may be compelled to hand over evidence to the
defendant, but only if the defendant requests specific evidence. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b).
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The SEC was initially reluctant to use section 929P(a). 84 One of the
first contested enforcement actions filed under the new jurisdictional
provision was against Rajat Gupta, a high-profile insider trading
respondent. 85 Gupta was one of at least twenty-eight defendants in a
sprawling insider-trading investigation into Raj Rajaratnam’s hedge fund
Galleon Management LP. The SEC sued twenty-seven defendants in
court, and one, Gupta, in the administrative forum. 86 Gupta filed a
lawsuit against the SEC in federal court seeking to enjoin the pending
proceeding before the ALJ. 87 Among other claims, he contended that the
proceeding before the ALJ would deprive him of equal protection
because similar defendants were sued in court, not before an ALJ. 88
After an exchange of briefs and a denial of the SEC’s motion to
dismiss, 89 the Enforcement Division moved to dismiss the administrative
enforcement action 90 and sued Gupta in court, like other defendants it
prosecuted for insider trading. 91
The SEC has faced additional constitutional challenges in lawsuits
seeking to enjoin enforcement actions filed in the administrative
forum. 92 Several district courts have ruled that using ALJs to resolve

84. See Morgenson, supra note 4.
85. Rajat K. Gupta, Securities Act Release No. 9192, Exchange Act Release No. 63995,
Investment
Company
Act
Release
No.
29590
(Mar.
1,
2011),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2011/33-9192.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N5RH-945F]
(order
instituting administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings).
86. Complaint at 1–2, Gupta v. SEC, 796 F. Supp. 2d 503 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), 2011 WL 923951.
87. Id. at 1.
88. See id. at 6–8.
89. Gupta, 796 F. Supp. 2d at 503.
90. Rajat K. Gupta, Securities Act Release No. 9249, Exchange Act Release No. 65037,
Investment Company Act Release No. 29745, 2011 WL 3407833 (Aug. 4, 2011) (order dismissing
proceedings).
91. Complaint, SEC v. Gupta, No. 1:11-cv-7566, 2013 WL 3784138 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2013),
2011 WL 5105859. Gupta may have thought that his chances for an acquittal were better in court, so
he rolled the dice and lost. Less than a year after the SEC dismissed the administrative proceeding
and filed a lawsuit in court, a jury found Mr. Gupta guilty of insider trading in a parallel criminal
action, and in mid-2013, the SEC, too, prevailed against Mr. Gupta in a sweeping summary
judgment decision. SEC v. Gupta, No. 1:11-cv-7566, 2013 WL 3784138, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. July 17,
2013) (holding in favor of the SEC on all counts on liability and remedies).
92. For an analysis of the constitutional arguments advanced by defendants in SEC enforcement
actions, see Alexander I. Platt, SEC Administrative Proceedings: Backlash and Reform, 71 BUS.
LAW. 1, 14 (2015).
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contested actions was either unconstitutional 93 or “likely
unconstitutional.” 94
The most successful and most commonly advanced claims have been
those based on the separation of powers as defined in Article II of the
U.S. Constitution, specifically appointment and removal authority. 95
ALJs are not appointed within the meaning of Article II by the
Commission as Article II requires for appointments of “inferior
officers.” 96 Instead, the Commission hires ALJs through a competitive
process managed by the U.S. Office of Personnel Management
(“OPM”). 97 When the Commission seeks to hire a new ALJ, the Chief
ALJ obtains a list of eligible candidates from OPM. The OPM sets the
evaluation criteria and the SEC’s Office of Human Resources makes the
ultimate selection based on those criteria. 98
In addition, ALJs enjoy multiple layers of protection from removal by
the President. 99 If ALJs are indeed inferior officers, then a violation of
Article II follows almost automatically, unless the United States
Supreme Court were to craft an exception. 100 Even if the Supreme Court
were to find ALJ appointment unconstitutional under the Appointments
Clause, the fix—appointment by the Commission 101—would not change
the procedural rules before ALJs nor the perception of their (un)fairness.
Marginally less successful have been claims that administrative
adjudication deprives respondents of the right to trial by jury guaranteed
by the Seventh Amendment. 102 The right to a jury trial only applies to
“suits at common law.” 103 The Supreme Court has held that “when
Congress creates new statutory ‘public rights,’ it may assign their
93. See Hill v. SEC, No. 1:15-cv-01801-LLM, 2015 WL 12030508 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 4, 2015);
Gupta, 796 F. Supp. 2d at 513 (holding that litigation before an ALJ deprived the defendant of equal
protection).
94. Jean Eaglesham, SEC Faces Block on In-House Judge, WALL ST. J., June 9, 2015, at C1.
95. See Platt, supra note 92, at 14 (listing eight defendants who raised removal claims).
96. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477, 511–12 (2010).
97. 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2012); 5 C.F.R. § 930.201(f) (2016).
98. 5 C.F.R. § 930.201(e)(2) (2016).
99. Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 484 (2010) (holding that “multilevel protection from
removal is contrary to Article II’s vesting of the executive power in the President”).
100. See Platt, supra note 92, at 15 (observing that given the widespread use of ALJs across the
federal bureaucracy, a holding of their unconstitutionality would be “potentially transformative”);
Zaring, supra note 20, at 1195 (explaining that given the importance of impartial administrative
adjudication, the Supreme Court would likely find an exception).
101. PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
102. “In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the
right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
103. Id.
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adjudication to an administrative agency . . . without violating the
Seventh Amendment.” 104 In addition, penalty regimes similar to the
SEC’s are widely used across the administrative state, suggesting that
challengers will either have to explain why SEC ALJ adjudications in
particular are bad or risk undermining much of administrative
practice. 105
Finally, defendants have raised objections related to due process and
non-delegation, none of which have succeeded, nor are they likely to. 106
Although the process before ALJs is different than the process in the
courts, both have passed constitutional muster in like situations.107
Lawsuits seeking to enjoin the SEC’s administrative proceedings for
constitutional infirmities have had mixed success. The D.C. Circuit held
that ALJ appointment and removal were consistent with Article II of the
U.S. Constitution, 108 while the Tenth Circuit held that they were not.109
On February 16, 2017, the D.C. Circuit vacated its earlier judgment and
granted the securities defendant’s petition for rehearing en banc. 110 By
contrast, the empirical challenge to ALJs has persisted without much
questioning.
D.

Empirical Challenges

In addition to arguing that ALJ adjudication is unconstitutional,
defendants and their counsel have effectively argued that administrative
proceedings are unfair. 111 To buttress their claims, they have invariably

104. Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHA Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 455 (1977).
105. Platt, supra note 92, at 18.
106. See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 759 (2002) (holding
that the similarities between adjudication before ALJs and before federal district court judges are
“overwhelming”); Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 55–56 (1975) (holding that it did not violate due
process for the SEC to both investigate and adjudicate a case); see also Zaring, supra note 20, at
1197.
107. See Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 535 U.S. at 743; Withrow, 421 U.S. at 55–56; Zaring, supra note
20, at 1197.
108. See Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
109. See David F. Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168 (10th Cir. 2016).
110. Order Granting Petitioner’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC,
832 F.3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (No. 1661665).
111. See Bondi, Ortiz & Wheatley, supra note 29; Olson, infra note 122 (concluding that the
amendments to the Rules of Practice “fail to provide adequate protection”); Brune, supra note 28, at
5 (arguing that more significant procedural changes were necessary because “the Commission is
able to stack the deck in its favor by having its cases adjudicated by its own judges”).
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relied on the Wall Street Journal report showing a disparity in success
rates. 112
Two strands of empirical critiques of the SEC’s administrative
adjudication have been advanced. The first contends that procedural
rules in administrative proceedings are so unfair to the respondents that
they simply cannot win against the SEC. 113 The second contends that
ALJs are biased against respondents because ALJs are SEC
employees. 114 Both strands rely on the same empirical data. 115
Perceptions that administrative proceedings may be biased for either
procedural or subjective reasons have been circulating for some time. In
October 2013, the New York Times published an op-ed that suggested
112. See Amended Complaint, Hill v. SEC, No. 1:15-cv-01801-LLM, 2015 WL 12030508 (N.D.
Ga. Aug. 4, 2015) (citing the Wall Street Journal article for the proposition that the SEC won in
90% of ALJ proceedings between January 2010 and March 2015); Complaint, Timbervest v. SEC,
No. 1:15-cv-02106-LMM, 2015 WL 7597428 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 4, 2015); Complaint, Tilton v. SEC,
No. 1:15-cv-2472, 2015 WL 4006165 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2015); Jean Eaglesham, U.S. Chamber of
Commerce Criticizes SEC’s In-House Court, WALL ST. J., July 15, 2015, at C3.
113. See Eaglesham, supra note 14; U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, CTR. FOR CAPITAL MARKET
COMPETITIVENESS, EXAMINING U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ENFORCEMENT:
RECOMMENDATIONS ON CURRENT PROCESSES AND PRACTICES, at 15; Joseph Quincy Patterson,
Many Key Issues Still Left Unaddressed in the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Attempt to
Modernize Its Rules of Practice, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1675, 1699 (2016); Ryan Jones, The
Fight Over Home Court: An Analysis of the SEC’s Increased Use of Administrative Proceedings, 68
SMU L. REV. 507, 510 (2015); Andrew N. Vollmer, Four Ways to Improve SEC Enforcement, 43
SEC. REG. L.J. 333, 336 (2015); William F. Johnson & Amelia R. Medina, SEC’s Administrative
Enforcement Intensifies Fairness Debate, N.Y. L.J. (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.newyorklawjournal.
com/id=1202675574765/SECs-Administrative-Enforcement-Intensifies-Fairness-Debate?slreturn=
20160705054020 [https://perma.cc/BU2P-T96U].
114. See, e.g., Jean Eaglesham, SEC Wins With In-House Judges, WALL ST. J. (May 7, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-wins-with-in-house-judges-1430965803 [https://perma.cc/E25ZEBS5]; Morgenson, supra note 4; Erin Fuchs, SEC “Victim” Mark Cuban Speaks out to Help Guy
Who’s Being Sued in Georgia, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 16, 2015, 11:12 AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/mark-cuban-speaks-out-against-the-secs-in-house-judges-2015-9
[https://perma.cc/4TXF-9GHW]. This is contrary to what experienced securities practitioners
believe. See, e.g., Jean Eaglesham, SEC Ex-Enforcement Chief Calls for Reforms to In-House
Judges, WALL ST. J. (May 12, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-ex-enforcement-chief-callsfor-reformsto-in-house-judges-1431471223 [https://perma.cc/7NCE-BBP9] (“Robert Mahony, who
retired as an SEC judge in 2012 after more than 14 years at the agency, told the New York
conference the SEC judges were ‘absolutely 100% fair [and] straight.’” (alteration in original));
McLucas & Martens, supra note 6, at A17 (opining that “there is no evidence that ALJs harbor
bias”); Daniel R. Walfish, The Real Problem with SEC Administrative Proceedings, and How to Fix
It, FORBES (July 20, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2015/07/20/the-real-problemwith-sec-administrative-proceedings-and-how-to-fix-it/ [https://perma.cc/AFZ8-NRZR] (“My own
observations are that the ALJs strive to be fair to all parties . . . .”).
115. A third strand, namely that the Commission hears appeals from ALJ initial decisions, has
been advanced but is less commonly invoked. Significantly, the Commission rarely rejects an ALJ’s
decision wholesale—though the same is true for appellate review of district court decisions. For
data on outcomes in appeals to the Commission, see supra note 63.
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disparate success rates between actions decided by ALJs as compared
with court. 116 But the data was limited to one year of enforcement
actions.
In October 2014, the Wall Street Journal published a front-page
report on SEC enforcement. 117 The story purported to show that the SEC
was substantially more likely to prevail against respondents it sued in
administrative proceedings than against respondents it sued in federal
district court.118 The Wall Street Journal reported that the SEC “won all
six contested administrative hearings [in fiscal year 2014] but only
61%—11 out of 18—[of] federal-court trials.” 119 In a subsequent story,
the Wall Street Journal reported that over a five year period, the SEC
prevailed in 90% of cases litigated before ALJs, compared with 69% of
cases tried in federal court. 120 Significantly, both stories suggested that
the SEC was sending more cases to in-house judges opportunistically,
because ALJs were more likely to rule in favor of the SEC. 121
Unlike previous news stories that relied on limited data, the Wall
Street Journal’s reporting purported to show a persistent disparity in
outcomes over several years. The report has had an unusually
widespread impact. Following the Wall Street Journal reporting, many
respected commentators observed that the lack of procedural protections
before ALJs “significantly disadvantages respondents who are charged
in the SEC’s in-house courts.” 122 One prominent judge concluded that
SEC administrative proceedings were “arguabl[y] unfair[],” and
suggested that difficult securities cases be decided “by neutral federal

116. Morgenson, supra note 4 (reporting that the SEC prevailed in 88% of cases filed before
ALJs and in 63% of cases filed in court during fiscal year 2011).
117. Eaglesham, supra note 14.
118. See id.
119. Id.
120. Eaglesham, supra note 114.
121. Id. (reporting that in fiscal years 2012 and 2013 the SEC prevailed in 90% and 100% of
trials before ALJs and in 75% and 63% of trials in court).
122. Theodore B. Olson, Gibson Dunn, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule on Amendments to
the Commission’s Rules of Practice (File No. S7-18-15) (Dec. 4, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/
comments/s7-18-15/s71815-8.pdf [https://perma.cc/XR8L-A6DF]. See also McLucas & Martens,
supra note 6, at A17; Jean Eaglesham, SEC Gives Ground on Judges; Facing Criticism and
Challenges, Agency Increases Defendants’ Legal Safeguards, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 24, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-gives-ground-on-judges-1443139425
[https://perma.cc/7BYU8DT6] (quoting Joel Cohen, a partner at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, who successfully defended
Nelson Obus in 2014 against the SEC as saying that he would not “have been able to develop the
facts that convinced the jury to find in [their] favor” before an ALJ).
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courts.” 123 Citing the same figures reported by the Wall Street Journal,
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce released a report in July 2015 in which
it suggested that defendants could not obtain a “full, fair, and impartial
adjudication” before administrative law judges. 124 Even academic
commentary jumped on the bandwagon. 125
These critiques culminated in two bills that were introduced in
Congress. The Due Process Restoration Act, introduced in October
2015, would empower securities defendants to remove enforcement
actions to federal court and raise the standard of persuasion before ALJs
from “preponderance of the evidence” to “clear and convincing.” 126 The
second bill, the Financial CHOICE Act, introduced in June 2016,
follows the approach of the first bill. 127 In addition, the bill would
prohibit the SEC from imposing an officer and director bar in an
administrative proceeding, 128 presumably to make filing enforcement
actions in the administrative forum less appealing. 129 The bill would also
give potential defendants the right “to make an in-person presentation”
before the commissioners in advance of filing an enforcement action.130
Both bills have lingered in Congress, though the CHOICE Act has
been revived in the new Congress. 131 The SEC, under significant and
sustained pressure to change its enforcement practices, 132 recently

123. Rakoff Address, supra note 17, at 7 (relying on the Wall Street Journal figures in concluding
that it is “hardly surprising in these circumstances that the S.E.C. won 100% of its internal
administrative hearings in the fiscal year ending September 30, 2014, whereas it won only 61% of
its trials in federal court during the same period”).
124. Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness, supra note 19, at 3.
125. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 20; Barnett, supra note 20; Mark, supra note 20; Jerry W.
Markham, Regulating the U.S. Treasury Market, 100 MARQ. L. REV. 185, 225 (2016); Platt, supra
note 92. The two exceptions are Professors Grundfest and Zaring. Grundfest, supra note 30; Zaring,
supra note 20.
126. See Garrett Press Release, supra note 27.
127. See Financial CHOICE Act of 2016, H.R. 5983, 114th Cong. § 416 (2016),
http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/choice_act-_discussion_draft.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9CJ6-Q6P5].
128. See id. § 418.
129. See Henning, supra note 27.
130. See H.R. 5983 § 414. Presumably this would be in addition to the defendant’s right to file a
Wells Submission in advance of filing the enforcement action. See SEC, DIV. ENFORCEMENT,
ENFORCEMENT MANUAL 20−22 (2016).
131. See Rachel Witkowski & Ryan Tracy, Republicans Get Ready to Roll Back Dodd-Frank
Law, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 5, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/republicans-are-poised-to-roll-outtheir-roll-back-of-dodd-frank-law-1486315341 [https://perma.cc/4XKV-2EHP].
132. Half of the comment letters on the proposed amendments to the SEC’s Rules of Practice
cited the Wall Street Journal news story to contend that securities defendants sued in administrative
proceeding “lose substantially more frequently than do defendants in federal court.” Brune, supra
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amended the Rules of Practice that govern litigation before ALJs. 133 The
amendments substantially expand respondents’ procedural rights in
administrative proceedings. In what I have described elsewhere as
primary enforcement actions, 134 the new rules give respondents ten
months instead of four to prepare a defense 135 and allow respondents to
take a limited number of depositions, 136 which previously they were not
authorized to do. The amendments give the Enforcement Division and
the respondent the right to file dispositive motions that are very similar
to the motions available in civil litigation in federal district court. 137
Hearsay evidence continues to be permitted, so long as it is relevant,
material, and reliable. 138 Because the amendments “fall short of the
procedural safeguards afforded defendants in federal district court,”
securities defense attorneys remain concerned about the purported
“statistical disparity” uncovered by the Wall Street Journal. 139
In addition to revising its Rules of Practice, in May 2015 the SEC
explained the criteria its staff would use to determine in which forum it
would bring an action. 140 Commentators derided the principles as

note 28, at 1; David M. Zornow, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, Comment Letter on
Proposed Rule on Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice (File No. S7-18-15) (Dec. 4,
2015), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-18-15/s71815-6.pdf [https://perma.cc/5BGX-D2BL];
Richard Foster, Financial Services Roundtable, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule on Amendments
to the Commission’s Rules of Practice (File No. S7-18-15) (Dec. 4, 2015),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-18-15/s71815-7.pdf [https://perma.cc/5BGX-D2BL]; Olson,
supra note 122; Tom Quaadman, Center for Capital Market Competitiveness, U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule on Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of
Practice (File No. S7-18-15) (Dec. 4, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-18-15/s7181512.pdf [https://perma.cc/W6AR-QDJS].
133. See Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 81 Fed. Reg. 50,212 (July 29,
2016) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 201).
134. See Urska Velikonja, Reporting Agency Performance: Behind the SEC’s Enforcement
Statistics, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 928–29 (2016) (describing primary enforcement actions as
actions seeking to establish that the defendant violated securities laws and to impose monetary
penalties, injunctions, cease-and-desist orders, and other sanctions).
135. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.360(a)(2)(ii) (2012).
136. See id. § 201.233(a).
137. See id. § 201.250.
138. See id. § 201.320(b).
139. See Bondi, Ortiz & Wheatley, supra note 29; Olson, supra note 122 (concluding that the
amendments to the Rules of Practice “fail to provide adequate protection”); Brune, supra note 28, at
5 (arguing that more significant procedural changes were necessary because “the Commission is
able to stack the deck in its favor by having its cases adjudicated by its own judges”).
140. SEC, DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT APPROACH TO FORUM SELECTION IN CONTESTED
ACTIONS, https://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcement-approach-forum-selection-contestedactions.pdf [https://perma.cc/M33U-SBYT].
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incoherent, 141 and they had a point. 142 The SEC has yet to offer more
definitive sorting principles.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, faced with incessant criticism
over the perceived disparity in outcomes, the SEC has opted to file more
actions in court, despite being authorized to litigate actions in the
administrative forum. 143 The shift is significant because actions in court
are generally more costly to litigate. For an agency that operates on a
limited budget, every dollar spent litigating actions in court that could be
litigated more cost-effectively in the administrative forum is a dollar not
spent prosecuting another securities violation. 144 The trade-off may be
worthwhile if the administrative forum is inappropriate for the case in
question, 145 but it is nevertheless a trade-off with associated costs and
benefits.
II.

CONTESTED ACTIONS IN SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT

The news stories have created a perception that ALJs who adjudicate
securities enforcement actions filed in the administrative forum are
biased against securities defendants, 146 or, in the alternate, that
procedural rules in the administrative forum make it difficult for
respondents to defend against charges of securities violations. 147
Moreover, critics have alleged that enforcement staff have taken
141. See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, Choosing the Battlefield in S.E.C. Cases, N.Y. TIMES (May 11,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/12/business/dealbook/choosing-the-battlefield-in-sec-cases
.html [https://perma.cc/8S9Z-RR56] (“The considerations provided by the enforcement division
about when it will recommend proceeding before an administrative judge rather than in federal
court shed little light on how the decision will be made.”); Patterson, supra note 113, at 1688.
142. See Grundfest, supra note 30, at 1148 (explaining that by litigating before ALJs, the SEC
wanted to take control over the interpretation of federal securities laws); SEC, SEC DIVISION OF
ENFORCEMENT APPROACH TO FORUM SELECTION IN CONTESTED ACTIONS (2015),
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcement-approach-forum-selection-contested-actions.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M33U-SBYT] (explaining that if a “contested matter is likely to raise unsettled
and complex legal issues under the federal securities laws . . . obtaining a Commission decision on
such issues, subject to appellate review in the federal courts, may facilitate development of the
law”).
143. Jean Eaglesham, SEC Trims Use of In-House Judges, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 2015, at A1
(reporting that the SEC filed only 11% of contested actions before ALJs in the fourth quarter of
fiscal year 2015, compared with almost 50% in the second quarter).
144. Cf. SEC, DIV. OF ENFORCEMENT, ENFORCEMENT MANUAL 4 (2016).
145. See, e.g., Grundfest, supra note 30, at 1186 (proposing a list of factors to decide when
litigation before ALJs may be appropriate in securities enforcement actions).
146. See Eaglesham, supra note 114; Morgenson, supra note 4; Fuchs, supra note 114. This is
contrary to what experienced securities practitioners believe. See, e.g., McLucas & Martens, supra
note 6, at A17 (opining that “there is no evidence that ALJs harbor bias”).
147. See supra note 113.
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advantage of the built-in bias and have been steering cases to ALJs to
increase their likelihood of winning. 148 As a result of the perception
created by the news stories, the SEC amended its Rules of Practice and
has filed fewer actions in the administrative forum since the controversy
emerged. 149
Given the real and significant impact of the Wall Street Journal’s
reporting, its data and analysis are worth re-examining. This Part reports
the results of an empirical investigation into SEC litigation. Contrary to
the allegations advanced in the Journal’s report, this Part concludes that
available data can neither confirm nor refute the charge that the SEC is
more likely to prevail before ALJs because of their bias in favor of the
SEC or because of the differences in procedural rules.
The analyzed data do, however, shed light on two related questions.
First, the evidence reported in this Part suggests that the SEC has
significantly increased the number of respondents sued in the
administrative forum. But, only about half of the increase is attributable
to the SEC’s exercise of its new power to seek fines against nonregistered persons in the administrative forum; the other half could have
been filed in the administrative forum before the change. 150 Moreover,
resolution of contested actions by ALJs remains the exception: a large
majority of contested cases continue to be filed in federal district
court. 151
Second, there is no robust support for the proposition that the SEC is
more likely to prevail in like cases before ALJs than in court. 152 The
variation in outcomes by type of forum reported by the Wall Street
Journal is largely explained by the different types of cases that are
prosecuted in court and by the fact that individuals, who are more often
sued in court than firms, are both more likely to contest the SEC’s
charges and more likely to prevail when they do so. 153
The lack of a robust relationship between the type of forum and case
outcome reported in this Part is significant because of the widelyaccepted assertions to the contrary. 154 As discussed in more detail in Part
148. See e.g., Eaglesham, supra note 14.
149. See Jean Eaglesham, SEC Trims Use of In-House Judges, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 11, 2015),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-trims-use-of-in-house-judges-1444611604, [https://perma.cc/25A
D-CKN2].
150. See discussion infra section II.B.
151. See discussion infra section II.B.
152. See Velikonja, supra note 134134, at 976 nn.414–16.
153. See discussion infra section II.C.
154. See discussion supra section I.D.
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III, the conclusions offered here should not be interpreted to imply that
the type of forum does not matter. There are significant omitted variable
and selection bias effects that cannot be resolved with the information
that is available. 155 However, the evidence offered in Part II and the
analysis discussed in Part III do suggest that any questions of whether
administrative adjudication is fair cannot definitively be resolved with
empirical evidence.
A.

Data and Methodology

The data reported and studied in this Article was drawn from Select
SEC and Market Data Reports (“Reports”) that the SEC prepares
annually and publishes on its website.156 The Reports include a list of all
enforcement actions filed during the fiscal year (“FY”), organized by
subject matter and date. 157 According to the Reports, between fiscal
years 2007 and 2015, the SEC filed about 650 to 800 enforcement
actions against 1400 to 1900 defendants per year. 158
The Reports list SEC litigation by the legal proceedings filed and not
by the defendant. 159 In previous work, I reported that the SEC often
targets multiple defendants in a single enforcement action and that the
same defendant can be targeted for the same securities violation in two
or more enforcement actions. 160 This practice renders the accounting of
securities enforcement by the number of enforcement actions filed
invalid and unreliable. 161 To remedy the problem, I reviewed each
enforcement action listed in the Reports for fiscal years 2007 to 2015
and pulled up the relevant documents in PACER or Bloomberg Law for
civil actions and in Westlaw or the SEC’s website for administrative
proceedings. The documents were reviewed, and the information coded
155. See discussion infra section III.A.
156. See Reports and Publications, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/reports [https://perma.cc/LW33TAFQ].
157. See, e.g., SEC, SELECT SEC AND MARKET DATA FISCAL 2015, 4–21 tbl.3 (2015),
https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/select-sec-and-market-data/secstats2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BHY9-8D7G].
158. The source of this information is the SEC annual reports and Select SEC and Market Data
reports. See Reports and Publications, SEC (Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/reports?aId=
TheSubtype_t1&TheYear=&TheSubtype=Select+SEC+and+Market+Data&TheDivision= [https://
perma.cc/8VRH-WZ3H].
159. See, e.g., SEC , SELECT SEC AND MARKET DATA FISCAL 2014, at 3–20 tbls. 2–3 (2015)
(reporting aggregate information and a complete list of enforcement actions filed in FY 2014).
160. See Velikonja, supra note 134, at 933–37.
161. See id. at 932–57 (discussing the various reasons that reported SEC enforcement statistics
are invalid and unreliable).
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and tabulated by defendants, not by enforcement actions. 162 The initial
coding excludes actions targeting delinquent filing and contempt
proceedings. 163 This yields a set of actions against 10,967 defendants.
In the next step, I excluded certain groups of defendants and actions
to ensure that the cases compared are, in fact, comparable. First, the data
only include defendants charged with securities violations and do not
include relief (or nominal) defendants, whom the SEC targeted because
they received ill-gotten gain but did not violate securities laws. 164
Although relief defendants often contest charges that the SEC brings,
they are, by definition, not securities violators that the SEC punishes.
Moreover, the SEC sues virtually all relief defendants in court. 165
Because their likelihood of prevailing against the SEC is driven by
different factors than the success of securities defendants, including
them in the analysis would not help to assess whether ALJs were more
likely to rule for the SEC than judges. Removing relief defendants
reduced the data set to 9967 defendants.
Second, only defendants targeted in primary enforcement actions are
included, 166 not respondents in follow-on and secondary actions. A
primary enforcement action is one in which the SEC targets a defendant
for violating securities laws and seeks an injunction or a cease-and-desist
order, and perhaps a fine, disgorgement, and other remedies. 167 Primary
enforcement actions are filed in court and in the administrative forum. 168
By contrast, the SEC files follow-on and secondary actions in the

162. Searches for civil actions were done in Bloomberg Law database (which makes PACER
available), and searches for administrative actions were done on the SEC’s website and in Westlaw.
163. Delinquent filing actions are filed in administrative proceedings and look very different from
other primary actions. Defendants are usually defunct entities, the remedy is revocation of the
common stock, and most actions are decided by default. See Velikonja, supra note 134, at 940–45.
Studies of SEC enforcement practices usually exclude delinquent filing actions. See STEPHEN CHOI,
SARA E. GILLEY & DAVID F. MARCUS, NYU POLLACK CTR. FOR LAW & BUS. AND CORNERSTONE
RESEARCH, SEC ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY AGAINST PUBLIC COMPANY DEFENDANTS, FISCAL
YEARS 2010–2015, at 11 (2016), http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/SEC-EnforcementActivity-FY2010-FY2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/4EJE-MVNB].
164. See Velikonja, supra note 134, at 946–47.
165. Data on file with author. See also Grundfest, supra note 30, at 1145 n.2.
166. The SEC divides enforcement actions into three categories: independent enforcement
actions, follow-on actions, and delinquent filing actions. See Press Release, Securities and Exchange
Commission, SEC Announces Enforcement Results for FY 2015 (Oct. 22, 2015),
http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-245.html [https://perma.cc/4NYC-JU3E]. The category
independent actions combines what I call primary actions and secondary actions. I have continued
to use the different nomenclature to avoid double-counting respondents in secondary actions.
167. See Velikonja, supra note 134, at 928–29.
168. See Velikonja, supra note 13, at 130 fig. 1.
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administrative forum only. 169 Both types of actions are second (and
sometimes third) proceedings against the same respondent for the same
violation. 170 Follow-on actions are based on injunctions or convictions
issued in earlier proceedings, and so respondents are collaterally
estopped from contesting the factual basis of the follow-on action. 171
The SEC should win follow-on actions. 172 As a result, the SEC’s
likelihood of success in a follow-on action is considerably higher than in
a primary enforcement action. The SEC files few secondary actions and
virtually all are either filed as settled actions or are settled during the
proceeding. 173
The compiled data includes actions against 8021 securities defendants
in primary enforcement actions. Of those, 5832 were prosecuted in
federal district court and 2189 in the administrative forum. In addition to
information on the forum in which the action was filed, I collected
information on the identity of the defendant (individual or firm); the type
of the violation; when the action was filed and when it was resolved or
whether it is still ongoing; what was the method of resolution (i.e., filed
as settled, settled, default, trial, summary judgment, dismissal, ongoing);
whether the case was accompanied by and/or based on a criminal action;
and the outcome. 174 In terms of outcomes, I collected information on
169. See Velikonja, supra note 134, at 929, 935.
170. A follow-on action is a second enforcement action filed against the same defendants for the
same violation. It is based on the first enforcement action in which the defendant was fined and
enjoined and seeks to impose a professional or associational bar.
The collected data includes follow-on actions against 1854 defendants and secondary actions
against 89 defendants. A subset of follow-on actions is based on a criminal conviction alone, and so
the follow-on action is the only proceeding before the SEC. These actions were also excluded. For a
detailed methodology, see id. at 925–32.
171. This is true whether the case was litigated or resolved by settlement. See Richard S. Kern &
Charles Wilkins, Initial Decision Release No. 281, 2005 WL 924285 (Apr. 21, 2005),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/aljdec/id281jtk.htm [https://perma.cc/D6QT-JG8Y].
172. Velikonja, supra note 134, at 963 (reporting that only defendants whose underlying
conviction or injunction was vacated prevailed against the SEC in a contested follow-on action).
173. Secondary actions, sometimes referred to as cease-and-desist actions, are best understood as
a concession to the respondent. Instead of filing one action in court seeking a fine and an injunction,
the Enforcement Division files two: a civil action seeking monetary penalties and an administrative
action seeking a cease-and-desist order. Id. at 929. This is a concession to the settling defendant
because cease-and-desist orders that are imposed in administrative proceedings generally tend to
have less significant consequences than obey-the-law injunctions imposed in court actions. See id. at
929–32. Of eighty-nine actions, only six were not settled; of those six, three were decided by
default, two were consolidated with actions filed in court, and one was voluntarily dismissed. Data
on file with author.
174. For civil actions, I performed docket searches and reviewed relevant documents as available
in PACER and Bloomberg Law. For administrative actions, the search was done in the SEC’s
database of administrative proceedings and in Westlaw.
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whether the SEC prevailed on at least one count of liability (decisions in
court cases are often bifurcated), 175 whether the finding of liability was
based on collateral estoppel by a criminal conviction or plea, and the
sanction that was imposed. The coding of outcomes includes all actions
that were filed in fiscal years 2007 to 2015 and concluded with a
substantive disposition on liability by September 15, 2016.
Table 1 below reports summary statistics on primary enforcement
actions filed in fiscal years 2007 to 2015. Both firms and individuals are
significantly more likely to be sued in court than before ALJs, but
individuals are statistically more likely than firms to be sued in court. 176
Table 1:
Summary Statistics of Filings and Case Resolutions

Filings
Individuals
Firms
Filed Settled Actions
Individuals
Firms

Court

Frequency

AP

Frequency

3876
1952

77.5%
64.7%

1122
1067

22.5%
35.3%

1063
429

27.4%
21.9%

771
865

68.6%
81.0%

As shown in the summary statistics table, firms are generally more
likely to settle during the investigation than are individuals, but less so
when the action is filed in court. Only a small minority of enforcement
actions are contested to the end and ultimately decided by a dispositive
motion or after trial. Of the cases that are not filed as settled, more than
half ultimately settle. Of the remainder, most are decided by default or
voluntarily dismissed because the defendant died, ceased to exist, could
not be served, or some similar reason, and only a sliver are contested to
the end and decided by a judge, a jury, or an ALJ. 177

175. See Andrew Ceresney, Dir., SEC Div. of Enf’t, Remarks at University of Texas School of
Law’s Government Enforcement Institute: The SEC’s Cooperation Program: Reflections on Five
Years of Experience, (May 13, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/sec-cooperation-program
.html [https://perma.cc/2N2L-SH4M] (describing the use of bifurcated settlements in cases where
defendants agree to cooperate with the SEC).
176. The difference is statistically significant at p<0.01.
177. See infra Table 3 and discussion in section II.C.
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Has the SEC Shifted Enforcement to the Administrative Forum?

During fiscal years 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016, the SEC reported
filing many more enforcement actions in administrative proceedings
than in previous years. 178 According to the Reports, in FY 2012 the SEC
filed 63% of enforcement actions against 52% of defendants in
administrative proceedings. 179 By FY 2014, the SEC filed 81% of
enforcement actions against 70% of defendants in administrative
proceedings. 180 A shift on that scale in two years is highly unusual, and
it has attracted considerable critical attention.181
The increase in the share of enforcement actions filed in the
administrative forum is due to several confounding factors. The statistics
included in the Reports include delinquent filing actions and follow-on
proceedings. Since 2010, the SEC has increased both; 182 both groups of
cases have always been filed in the administrative forum. 183 Second,
since FY 2013 the SEC has increasingly filed actions that are settled
during the investigation in the administrative forum. 184 In FY 2010,
before Dodd-Frank’s adoption, the SEC filed 32% of settled
enforcement actions in the administrative forum. 185 By FY 2015, the
SEC filed 83% of settled enforcement actions in the administrative
forum. 186 For various reasons, when the matter is settled during the
investigation, both the SEC and settling defendants usually prefer to file
the settled action in the administrative forum. 187
178. Compare SEC, SELECT SEC AND MARKET DATA: FISCAL 2010, at 3 tbl.2 (2010),
https://www.sec.gov/about/secstats2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/98PX-F22B] (reporting 429 actions
filed in administrative proceedings) with SEC, SELECT SEC AND MARKET DATA: FISCAL 2014, at 2
tbl.1
(2014),
http://www.sec.gov/about/secstats2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7MSL-RC5A]
[hereinafter SEC, FY 2014] (reporting 610 actions filed in administrative proceedings).
179. See SEC, SELECT SEC AND MARKET DATA FISCAL 2012, at 3 tbl.2.
180. See SEC, FY 2014, supra note 178, at 3 tbl.2.
181. See, e.g., Zaring, supra note 20, at 1174; Platt, supra note 92, at 9 (suggesting that court
losses “caused the agency to shift” to administrative adjudication); Michael Dvorak, SEC
Administrative Proceedings and Equal Protection “Class of One” Challenges: Evaluating
Concerns About SEC Forum Choices, 2015 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1195 (2015); Eaglesham, supra
note 114 (quoting former SEC Commissioner Grundfest observing that this is “a fundamental
change”).
182. See Velikonja, supra note 134, at 978, 980.
183. In both, the SEC succeeds at much higher rates than in primary enforcement actions, but its
success is not generally considered as problematic. As noted above, these actions were not included
in the statistical comparison of outcomes reported in section II.C.3.
184. See Velikonja, supra note 13, at 129.
185. Id. at 130 fig.1, 137 tbls. 1−3.
186. This is measured by the number of defendants, not actions. See id. at 130.
187. See id. at 126.
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By contrast, the increase in the number and the share of contested
actions 188 filed in the administrative forum has been relatively modest.
In FY 2010, the fiscal year during which the Dodd-Frank Act became
effective, the SEC filed contested enforcement actions against 504
defendants overall. 189 Of these, forty defendants (8%) were sued in the
administrative forum and 464 (92%) in court. In FY 2015, the SEC filed
contested actions against 577 defendants. Of those, 105 defendants
(18%) were sued in the administrative forum and 472 (82%) in court. As
shown in Figure 1 below, the change in the number and the share of
defendants who are forced to litigate before ALJs is relatively small, but
the difference is statistically significant.
Figure 1:
Filings in Contested Cases by Year 190

The increase in the number of contested case filings in administrative
proceedings is not due entirely to the SEC’s newly-expanded
jurisdiction. A review of all contested orders instituting administrative
proceedings between FY 2011 and 2015 reveals that a significant

188. The term “contested action” in this context is meant to include actions that were not filed as
settled actions. Many of actions that were initially contested ultimately settled.
189. Data on file with author.
190. The figure reports the number of defendants targeted in contested actions.
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majority, 294 of 403, could have been filed in the administrative forum
before the statutory change. 191 These include actions against registered
investment advisors, broker dealers, and transfer agents for violations of
various regulatory and disclosure requirements; they also include stop
orders targeting false registered offerings of securities. Thus, about half
of the increase in the number of contested actions filed in the
administrative forum is attributable to the SEC’s exercise of
prosecutorial discretion, not to the Dodd-Frank amendment. 192
However, the other half of contested actions filed in the
administrative forum since FY 2011, about 109, 193 were filed pursuant to
the SEC’s new authority. That number certainly would have been higher
absent the controversy about ALJ bias. 194 As suggested by the figures
reported in Table 2, the bulk of these cases target securities offering and
issuer disclosure and reporting, not insider trading, as some of the
commentary has suggested. 195 Most of these cases are still ongoing, so—
despite the effort in this Article—it is somewhat premature to examine
the SEC’s track record in litigation before ALJs after Dodd-Frank.
As a general matter, the SEC has not used expanded jurisdiction of
ALJs to advance novel theories of securities violations in contested
administrative proceedings, as has been suggested. 196 Most first-of-its-

191. Data was hand-coded, so the number is best understood as an approximation and not an
exact figure.
192. Between FY 2007 and 2010, the SEC sued on average 38.75 respondents in administrative
proceedings. Assuming similar trends were to continue, the SEC would sue 194 respondents in
administrative proceedings between FY 2011 and 2015. Instead, it sued 403 for an increase of 209
over the pre-Dodd-Frank average. Of those, 100 were defendants who could have been sued in
administrative proceedings before Dodd-Frank.
193. The data was hand-coded, so the number is best understood as an approximation and not an
exact figure.
194. See Eaglesham, supra note 143, at A1 (reporting that the SEC filed only 11% of contested
actions before ALJs in the fourth quarter of fiscal 2015, compared with almost 50% in the second
quarter).
195. See, e.g., Zaring, supra note 20, at 1155; Yin Wilczek, SEC to Pursue More Insider Trading
Cases in Administrative Forum, Director Says, BLOOMBERG BNA (June 13, 2014),
http://www.bna.com/sec-pursue-insider-n17179891282/ [https://perma.cc/7TTW-V2Z4]. In fact,
only seven defendants who contested charges of insider trading were sued in administrative
proceedings between 2011 and 2015.
196. To be fair, the contention is not that the SEC has often used ALJs to secure a favorable reinterpretation of the law. Rather, the contention is that the Commission could adopt novel legal
intepretations in cases it adjudicates on appeal from an ALJ’s initial decision and then demand
Chevron deference. See Andrew N. Vollmer, SEC Revanchism and the Expansion of Primary
Liability Under Section 17(a) and Rule 10b-5, 10 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 273 (2015) (discussing the
SEC’s demand for Chevron deference to a novel interpretation of securities laws in the SEC’s
administrative case against Flannery).
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kind actions were filed as settled actions, not as contested actions.197
Instead, as shown in Table 2, the most common charges are similar to
the charges that the SEC brings in court: fraudulent disclosure, offering
of unregistered securities, and violations related to pooled investment
vehicles.
Table 2:
The Number of Defendants Sued in Administrative Proceedings
by Subject Matter Category

Broker Dealer
Investment
Adviser
Insider Trading
Issuer
Reporting
Market
Manipulation
Securities
Offering
Other
All Contested
in APs
All Contested
in Court

2007–10
average
13.75
10.75

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

15
15

27
35

15
34

10
26

11
28

0.5
3.25

3
6

0
3

0
12

3
19

1
13

2

2

3

1

0

2

2.5

5

1

20

37

45

6
38.75

1
47

3
72

0
82

2
97

5
105

518.75

532

535

409

316

472

In sum, since FY 2011 the SEC has started litigating more
aggressively in the administrative forum in both settled and contested
actions. The increase is considerable and statistically significant. But the
overall number of cases litigated before ALJs remains small compared
with the number of cases litigated in court, as shown in Figure 1 above.
Moreover, a significant portion of the increase is not attributable to the
use of the SEC’s new authority to sue non-registered firms and
individuals in the administrative forum. Since FY 2011, the SEC has

197. See Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, Chairman’s Address at SEC Speaks 2015 (Feb. 20, 2015),
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2015-spch022015mjw.html [https://perma.cc/B7N6-YUU9].
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been aggressive in targeting violations that could have been litigated in
the administrative forum before the Dodd-Frank amendment. 198
In other words, since FY 2011, the SEC has changed the mix of the
cases it prosecutes, and many of the contested cases it has litigated
before ALJs have been those that can only be prosecuted in the
administrative forum. At the same time, the SEC has used its new
authority to sue before ALJs more than one hundred defendants that it
could have sued only in court before the Dodd-Frank Act. The
development is important and one that invites and deserves further
study.
C.

Is There a Disparity in Outcomes Depending on Where the
Enforcement Action Is Filed?

The previous section analyzed changes in filing practices after the
Dodd-Frank amendment; this one analyzes case outcomes using the
same data. The section begins with an overview of outcomes in SEC
enforcement actions. It then defines important variables that are
necessary to test the claim that the SEC is more likely to prevail when it
litigates before ALJs than in court.
The Wall Street Journal report that compared the SEC’s success rates
in court and before ALJs did not perform any statistical tests of
significance. 199 This section uses both a chi-squared test and logistic
regression. The chi-squared test compares success rates by venue
without controlling for other potentially significant variables. By
contrast, in logistic regression, one is able to perform multivariate
analysis by controlling for (i.e., holding constant) selected qualities. 200 In
other words, logistic regression allows one to test whether the higher
likelihood of success before ALJs is due to the type of forum or some
other case characteristic. This section uses both statistical methods for a
very limited purpose, namely to test whether there is a robust association
between the type of forum in which a case is litigated and the
outcome. 201
198. For example, between 2011 and 2015, the SEC prosecuted thirty-one defendants in stop
order proceedings, compared with nine between 2007 and 2010. A stop order proceeding is not
settled or contested: it is an action taken ex officio. Data on file with author.
199. See Eaglesham, supra note 114.
200. See, e.g., David Freeman Engstrom, The Twiqbal Puzzle and Empirical Study of Civil
Procedure, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1203, 1219 (2013) (explaining the differences between a chi-squared
test and logistic regression).
201. This Article does not purport to draw any inferences about settled cases and so does not get
into the Priest-Klein hypothesis or its critics. See Daniel Klerman & Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, Inferences
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As is true for litigation generally, 202 the vast majority of the SEC’s
cases ultimately settle. But contrary to the common view, a minority of
defendants have settled with the SEC by the time the action is
initiated. 203 Of cases filed between fiscal years 2007 and 2015, 3124 of
8021 defendants (39%) settled by the time the SEC filed a public
enforcement action. Settlement rates vary from year to year: during the
study period, in FY 2009, 32% of defendants settled at initiation; in FY
2014, 48% of defendants did.
As noted, most defendants ultimately settle. More than half of
defendants that initially contested the charges settled during the public
proceeding, resulting in an overall settlement rate of around 75%. 204
Only a small minority of defendants, 283 of 8021 defendants (3.6%),
litigated their cases to trial. For actions resolved by a third-party
adjudicator, it is more common that they are decided by default (721
defendants or 9%) or by summary disposition (364 defendants or 4.5%)
than by trial.

from Litigated Cases, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 209 (2014); George Priest & Benjamin Klein, The
Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).
202. See J. Maria Glover, The Federal Rules of Civil Settlement, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1713, 1723
(2012) (observing that “most cases terminate in settlement”).
203. Several authors have reported—incorrectly—that the SEC’s settlement rate exceeds 90%.
See, e.g., Samuel W. Buell, Liability and Admissions of Wrongdoing in Public Enforcement of Law,
82 U. CIN. L. REV. 505, 505–06 (2013); Ross MacDonald, Setting Examples, Not Settling: Toward a
New SEC Enforcement Paradigm, 91 TEX. L. REV. 419, 421 (2012) (stating that the SEC had settled
98% of cases in recent years); David M. Weiss, Reexamining SEC’s Use of Obey-the-Law
Injunctions, 7 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 239, 239–40 (2006); Roger Parloff, The Judge Who Slapped
Citi, FORTUNE (Nov. 30, 2011), http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2011/11/30/judge-jed-rakoffcitigroup-sec/ [https://perma.cc/RW75-AYNC].
204. Of the cases filed in fiscal years 2007 to 2015 and resolved by September 15, 2016,
defendants settled in 78% of cases (the denominator to calculate the overall settlement rate does not
include ongoing cases).
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Table 3:
Case Disposition (2007–15) 205

Filed Settled
Settled
Default
Dismissal 206
Involuntary
Voluntary
(Def. win)
Procedural
(no win)
Summary
Disposition
Trial/ALJ 207
Ongoing (i.e.,
no decision)
Total

Court

Frequency

Frequency

25.6%
39.3%
10.9%

Administrative
Proceeding
1632
272
85

1492
2292
636
29
47

0.5%
0.8%

0
1

0.0%
0.0%

141

2.4%

14

0.6%

357

6.2%

7

0.3%

127
711

2.2%
12.2%

156
22

7.1%
1.0%

5832

74.6%
12.3%
3.9%

2189

In light of the variety in possible case outcomes, one can analyze the
SEC’s success rate by type of forum in a variety of ways. First, one
could look at outcome after trial in court and before ALJs, like the news
reports to date have done. The first news story, reported in October
2013, noted that the SEC prevailed in 88% of cases filed before ALJs
and in 63% of cases filed in court during FY 2011. 208 The Wall Street
Journal story, published a year later, reported that between October
2013 and September 2014, “the SEC won all six contested
205. The table includes cases filed in fiscal years 2007 to 2015 and resolved by September 15,
2016.
206. “Involuntary dismissals” are those issued by a third-party adjudicator. “Voluntary
dismissals” are those by SEC motion where the case was dismissed because the SEC could not
prevail. “Procedural dismissals” are dismissals that were ordered by SEC motion because the case
could not continue (e.g., defendant died or dissolved, voluntarily complied, settled another matter),
and do not suggest that the defendant prevailed.
207. The category “Trial/ALJ” includes dispositions in 51 cases that are still ongoing but where
an ALJ had issued an Initial Decision and the defendant, the Enforcement Division, or both
appealed the Initial Decision to the Commission. This was done to test the charge that ALJs, by
virtue of being employees of the SEC, are biased in its favor.
208. Morgenson, supra note 4.
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administrative hearings where verdicts were issued, but only 61%—11
out of 18—federal-court trials.” 209 The same article noted that in the
preceding two fiscal years, the SEC won 90% and 100% of
administrative cases and 70% and 67% of trials in court. 210 In a followup story, the Wall Street Journal reported that the SEC had been steering
cases increasingly to ALJs and prevailed in 90% of cases litigated before
ALJs, compared with 69% of cases tried in federal court.211 The news
stories do not explain the methodology used, so the effort to reproduce
the newspapers’ analyses is a best guess based on the available data.
Table 4 shows the SEC’s success rates in cases decided after trial: the
SEC prevails in fewer than 83% of jury and bench trials in court but in
89% of cases decided by ALJs. 212 The SEC prevails in over 96% of
court cases decided by summary judgment and in 100% of ALJ
summary dispositions. The SEC also loses at motion to dismiss in court
but not before ALJs. The latter is due to the fact that the motion to
dismiss was not available in ALJ litigation until July 2016. Whether one
compares success rates after trial or at any stage of litigation, the
difference in outcomes in cases filed in court and in administrative
forum is much smaller than the one reported by the Wall Street Journal,
and is not statistically significant. 213
In fact, the only way to reconstruct the Wall Street Journal’s
figures—90% success rate before ALJ and 69% success rate in court—is
by including trials and involuntary dismissals in the tally, but not
summary judgments. 214 But doing that would be a mistake, as any
lawyer knows. Summary judgment resolves the case on the merits, just
like a trial. Omitting summary judgments also biases the comparison. As
reported in Table 4, nearly all summary judgments are issued by courts
and not ALJs. The SEC is considerably more likely to prevail in a case
decided by summary judgment than it is when the case goes to trial.215 If

209. Eaglesham, supra note 14.
210. See id.
211. Eaglesham, supra note 114.
212. Prevailing on at least one of the counts is coded as a win by the SEC. This is consistent with
the approach adopted by the news stories as well as by the SEC annual reports. See discussion infra
at notes 238–37 and accompanying text.
213. The p-value in a chi-square test is 0.177.
214. Using the numbers in cases resolved after trial and motions to dismiss reported in Table 4,
one obtains a 67% success rate in court and 90% before ALJs.
215. The reason that the SEC prevails at summary judgment at such high rates is not bias on the
part of federal district judges, it is the fact that many of its enforcement actions are well founded. In
addition to defendants who were convicted before the resolution of the summary judgment motion,
fifty-five were later convicted or pleaded guilty to securities fraud related to the same set of facts as
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one compares success rates in all actions decided by a judge or an ALJ
over the SEC’s objection, the SEC’s success rates are 87.5% in court and
89.6% before an ALJ. The difference is not statistically significant.
Table 4:
Likelihood of Success by Type of Litigation Forum

(1) Trial/ ALJ 216
(2) Summary
Disposition
(3) Involuntary
Dismissal
(4) Voluntary
Dismissal
Total (1–3)
Total (1–4)

Decided
in Court
127
357

SEC
win
105
344

Win
rate
82.7%
96.4%

Decided
in AP
156
7

SEC
win
139
7

Win
rate
89.1%
100.0%

29

0

0.0%

0

0

n. a.

47

0

0.0%

1

0

0.0%

513
560

449
449

87.5%
80.2%

163
164

146
146

89.6%
89.0%

To this one must add two important caveats. First, sometimes the
reason that the SEC prevails at summary judgment is that the defendant
is fighting a losing battle. In enforcement actions that prosecute offering
fraud schemes (e.g., Ponzi, pyramid, and like schemes), penny stock
frauds, and insider trading, in particular, the SEC often sues defendants
who are facing criminal charges for the same misconduct. As defendants
plead guilty or are convicted, the SEC moves for summary judgment on
liability in the civil case. In 80 of 344 summary judgments at which the
SEC prevailed, the order granting summary judgment for the SEC was
based on the defendant’s earlier criminal conviction or guilty plea.
the summary judgment motion. While defendants usually can and do contest the allegations in the
SEC’s complaint, the fact that they were later criminally sanctioned for the same misconduct goes a
long way towards explaining why the SEC is so successful at summary judgment.
It does happen that a defendant prevails against the SEC at summary judgment by lying to the
enforcement staff. One such defendant was later indicted for the same violation. See Spanish
Investor Indicted for Impeding SEC Investigation and Litigation Regarding $4.6 Million Insider
Trading Scheme, Litigation Release No. 23591, SEC Docket (CCH) 3634701 (July 5, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2016/lr23591.htm [https://perma.cc/6ZHD-PEMW].
216. The category “Trial/ALJ” includes dispositions in 51 cases that are still ongoing but where
an ALJ had issued an Initial Decision and the defendant, the Enforcement Division, or both
appealed the Initial Decision to the Commission. This was done for two reasons: first, to be
consistent with the Wall Street Journal’s method, and second, to test the charge that ALJs, by virtue
of being employees of the SEC, are biased in its favor.
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Because convicted defendants are collaterally estopped from denying the
allegations related to the criminal charges in the SEC enforcement
action, the court usually grants the SEC’s request for summary
judgment. 217 Excluding these summary judgments from the comparison
of success rates lowers the SEC’s success rate in court to 369 of 433, or
85%—only marginally lower than the SEC’s 90% success rate in the
administrative forum and not statistically significant.
Second, not all dismissals are created equal. Enforcement actions are
rarely resolved by a contested motion to dismiss. If a case is dismissed,
it is usually because the statute of limitations has run, 218 or because the
court has no personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 219 Vacatur, an
order setting aside a judgment or vacating the legal proceeding, is
similarly rare; lower court dispositions or settlements are vacated either
when a higher court reverses the district or appellate court’s judgment,
as occurred in the Supreme Court’s decision in Gabelli v. SEC, 220 or
when a higher court reverses a related decision, as occurred after the
Second Circuit decided the United States v. Newman insider-trading
case. 221 After Newman, district courts vacated settlements and summary
judgment decisions rendered against ten defendants in SEC enforcement
actions, and they may vacate more.222 These dismissals are included in
Tables 3 and 4 as involuntary dismissals against the SEC (i.e., as
defendant “wins” by involuntary dismissal).
Despite a handful of highly-publicized involuntary dismissals, a large
majority of dismissals are voluntary. 223 The SEC may file a motion to
dismiss the action without prejudice and without cost (i.e., each side
bears its litigation expenses) for a variety of reasons. More often than
not, a voluntary dismissal does not imply that the SEC lost. The SEC
routinely moves to dismiss an action against a defendant who died

217. Courts grant the SEC’s summary judgment motions on liability, leaving the only remaining
question, on appropriate remedies, for further proceedings. More often than not, the court imposes
an injunction and associational bar, but waives or gives credit for fines, forfeiture, and restitution
ordered in the criminal case.
218. SEC v. Graham, 21 F. Supp. 3d 1300 (S.D. Fla. 2014). The decision was recently in part
reversed on appeal. See SEC v. Graham, 823 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2016).
219. SEC v. Sharef, 924 F.Supp.2d 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
220. __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1216 (2013).
221. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014).
222. See Ed Beeson, Newman’s Domino Effect: 12 Cases on Edge After Cert. Denial, LAW360
(Oct. 13, 2015, 9:34 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/713046/newman-s-domino-effect-12cases-on-edge-after-cert-denial [https://perma.cc/7W77-74YJ].
223. Details on dismissals are shown supra Table 3.
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during the proceeding or ceased operations. 224 These dismissals are
neither wins nor losses for the SEC, and they are categorized as
neither. 225 Voluntary dismissals and postponements for failure to locate
and/or serve the defendant because he fled to Tonga 226 or Argentina, 227
likewise, are neither wins nor losses for the SEC, even if the defendant
ultimately escapes liability. Similarly, actions that the SEC drops
because the defendant was convicted,228 settled a related enforcement
action, 229 or complied with the SEC’s demand voluntarily 230 should not
count as losses for the SEC. Finally, when the SEC closes a receivership
in court, it often voluntarily dismisses enforcement actions against
entities after prevailing against the individual who used the entity to
perpetrate his scheme. These dismissals are essentially “wins” for the
SEC, rather than “losses,” but were nonetheless excluded from the
analysis. 231
At the same time, at least some of the voluntary dismissals should be
understood as acknowledgements by the Enforcement Division that the
case is unwinnable. For example, the SEC sometimes amends the
complaint and drops a defendant from the complaint without
explanation. 232 At other times, the SEC files a settled motion to dismiss
the action without prejudice and without cost. While the motion usually
does not explain the reason, news articles and press releases published
contemporaneously often explain that the SEC dismissed the action

224. See, e.g., LPB Capital & Gary J. Pappas, Exchange Act Release No. 69885, 2013 WL
3271085 (June 28, 2013) (dismissing the proceeding in light of Pappas’ death, LPB Capital’s
request to terminate investment adviser registration, and inability to pay disgorgement or penalties).
225. That is, they are excluded from the analysis of contested actions.
226. Christopher A.T. Pedras, Admin. Proc. Rulings No. 3773 (ALJ Apr. 8, 2016) (postponement
order) https://www.sec.gov/alj/aljorders/2016/ap-3773.pdf [https://perma.cc/QLJ4-SNSG].
227. Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, SEC v. Walters, No. 1:09-cv-337 (D. Colo. May 14, 2015).
228. Order for Judgment, SEC v. Shields & Geodynamics, Inc., No. 1:11-cv-2121 (D. Colo. Mar.
16, 2015).
229. John Briner, Securities Act Release No. 9921, Exchange Act Release No. 75951, 2015 WL
5472562 (Sept. 18, 2015) (order dismissing Chris Whetman, CPA from proceeding).
230. Registration Statement of Sahas Technologies LLC, Securities Act Release No. 9189, 2011
WL 553599 (Feb. 17, 2011).
231. If they were coded as “wins,” they would be included in the Expanded model below. This
would increase the SEC’s success rate in court and would render the predictor ALJ no longer
statistically significant. See infra section II.C.3 and Table 6.
232. See Amended Complaint, SEC v. Aragon Capital Advisors LLC, No. 1:07-cv-919 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 22, 2007) (listing Noga Delshad as defendant); Second Amended Complaint, Aragon, No.
1:07-cv-919 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2010) (dropping Noga Delshad from the list of defendants).
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because it could not advance a successful case. 233 Voluntary dismissals
that should properly be understood as SEC “losses” are most common in
insider trading actions, and they were included in some of the analyses
of case outcomes reported below.
Overall, 232 cases against defendants sued between 2007 and 2015
were dismissed. I reviewed all 232 cases. In addition, I searched for
accompanying news stories to find a reason for the dismissal. The
actions were hand coded for whether the dismissal was by SEC motion
or whether the SEC objected to the dismissal (i.e., voluntary or
involuntary): 29 dismissals were involuntary 234 and 203 voluntary.
Voluntary dismissals were further coded for whether voluntary dismissal
was best understood as a “win” by the defendant. In 155 of 203
voluntary dismissals neither side prevailed, and the case was dismissed
due to death, voluntary compliance, or other external circumstances. In
48 of 203 voluntary dismissals, either contemporaneous SEC filings,
press releases or news reports indicated that the SEC moved to dismiss
the case because it did not believe it could prevail, or there was no
information; these cases were coded as defendant “wins.” 235 If all 48
voluntary dismissals coded as defendant wins are included in the
comparison, the SEC prevailed against 449 of 560 defendants in court
(80% success rate) and against 146 of 164 defendants in administrative
proceedings (89% success rate). Unlike all other reported differences in
success rates, this difference is statistically significant. 236 This result
does not imply that ALJs are biased in favor of the SEC; it merely
suggests that a defendant sued in court might fare better, in part because
the SEC is more likely to dismiss the action voluntarily.
But even this conclusion is premature. The analysis thus far does not
account for any case or defendant characteristics that could explain the
difference in success rates. The section does suggest, however, that a
comparison of outcomes is more complicated than suggested by the Wall
Street Journal and that the numbers the newspapers have reported are
not credible.
233. Such voluntary dismissals are celebrated in the press as SEC losses. See, e.g., James B.
Stewart, Another Fumble by the S.E.C. on Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2012, at B1 (reporting that
the SEC, “in a rare public about-face,” asked a judge to dismiss charges against a defendant).
234. These include insider trading actions that were originally settled or decided by summary
judgment but were vacated post-Newman.
235. All told, about 20 cases had no information that would help with coding. All were coded as
defendant wins, but regressions in section II.C.3 report the results separately, with these 20 cases
coded as defendant wins and excluding them from the model as neutral voluntary dismissals.
236. The chi-square statistic is 5.6706; the p-value is .01725. This result is significant at p<0.05.
The result is the same if summary judgments based on criminal convictions are excluded.
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Description of the Variables

Comparisons to this point do not control for anything other than
where the case is litigated and whether it is based on a prior conviction.
But commentators as well as SEC representatives have pointed out that
cases vary significantly along other dimensions. 237 For example, many
of the SEC’s losses at trial have been in insider trading cases. To test the
hypothesis that the type of forum matters, I used logistic regression, in
which I controlled for case and defendant characteristics. This section
provides more detail on how the response variable was constructed and
what predictors in addition to the type of forum were used in the
regressions reported in section II.C.3. Part III discusses the limitations of
the model, in particular the inability to control for case quality, and
discusses the implications of the results in light of that limitation.
a.

The Response Variable: What Counts as “Success”?

The SEC itself measures success as the percentage of defendants in
enforcement actions against which the SEC prevails on at least one of
the counts. 238 Alternately, success can be defined more narrowly to
record as SEC wins only those cases where the SEC prevails on the most
serious charges, such as violations of scienter-based provisions of
securities laws, 239 or even more narrowly to record as successes only
those cases where the SEC receives all of the relief it seeks. 240 This
Article adopts the SEC’s own definition of success. It does so because it
is the definition adopted in the news stories that have reported on the
SEC’s success rates and the primary purpose of the study is to question
the analysis using the same data.
b.

Predictors of Success

The comparisons of success rates reported in section II.C.1 compare
outcomes by type of forum without controlling for any other aspects of
case quality. But factors other than the forum the case is filed in likely
affect the SEC’s likelihood of success. The logistic regression analysis

237. See Grundfest, supra note 30, at 1175–84.
238. See, e.g., SEC, FY 2010 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 27 (2010),
https://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/K674-G688] (reporting that the
SEC prevailed in 92% of enforcement actions resolved in FY 2010).
239. Under that definition of success, cases where the SEC prevails only on the subsidiary,
negligence-based, or strict-liability counts would count as losses for the SEC.
240. See Zaring, supra note 20, at 1176.
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reported in section II.C.3 includes four independent variables that were
expected to be significant predictors 241 of the likelihood of success: the
type of forum in which the action is filed, whether the defendant is a
firm or an individual, whether the action is accompanied by and/or based
on a criminal conviction or plea, and the subject matter category of the
enforcement action. I also collected information on the year in which the
actions were filed and resolved and on who was SEC Chair at the time
the action was filed, but these were not significant predictors of success
and so were not included in the regression analyses reported below.
This section provides additional detail on why I selected the
predictors included in the regression and how I collected the relevant
information. First, this Article tests the Wall Street Journal’s claim that
the forum in which the case is filed is significantly correlated with the
likelihood of success, so that variable was included in all regressions.
Second, as suggested by information included in Table 1, individuals
are significantly more likely than firms to contest an enforcement action.
The reasons vary but one important reason is that individuals are much
more likely than firms to face significant bars and collateral
consequences that result from a finding of liability. 242 Because
individuals are more likely to contest charges, one would expect
outcomes in cases against individuals to be different than outcomes in
cases against firms.
Third, where the SEC’s case accompanies a criminal action for the
same violation, that violation is likely more serious and the SEC’s odds
of winning higher than when the SEC prosecutes alone. For existence of
parallel criminal proceedings, I searched in Bloomberg Law for criminal
actions against the defendant, and I reviewed indictments or criminal
information documents for facts matching those in the SEC enforcement
action. To code for whether the disposition in the SEC’s case was based
on a parallel criminal case, I read the SEC’s dispositive motion (usually
the motion for summary judgment) and the court opinion or
memorandum explaining the decision granting the SEC’s motion. If the
opinion mentioned that the defendant was collaterally estopped from
disputing the facts, the case was coded as “based on” a criminal action.
241. In the older literature on statistics, the term independent variable is commonly used to refer
to inputs that have some influence on the output or response variable. In the modern statistical
literature, independent variables are called predictors, the term this paper adopts. See TREVOR
HASTIE, ROBERT TIBSHIRANI & JEROME FRIEDMAN, THE ELEMENTS OF STATISTICAL LEARNING:
DATA MINING, INFERENCE, AND PREDICTION 9 (2d ed. 2009).
242. See Urska Velikonja, Waiving Disqualification: When Do Securities Violators Receive a
Reprieve?, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1081, 1112 (2015) (reporting that individuals almost never receive
waivers from automatic disqualification provisions).
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Finally, I included the subject matter categorization because the
likelihood that the SEC will prevail varies significantly by the type of
violation charged. Ceteris paribus, the SEC should be much more likely
to prevail when the violation does not require a showing of mens rea
(i.e., strict liability violations) than where the SEC must prove scienter.
Many rules in the regulated securities industry are strict liability
provisions, so one would expect the SEC’s success rate to be higher in
actions against broker-dealers and investment advisers, for example,
than in actions targeting insider trading. Case categorization is thus
expected to be an important predictor of SEC success on the merits.
To code for subject matter category, I used the SEC’s Reports for
initial coding of subject matter. I coded cases in one of the six
categories: securities offering, market manipulation, broker dealer,
investment adviser, issuer reporting, and insider trading. Eight cases
were coded as “other” because the SEC categorized them as other
categories and there were not enough cases in each of the categories to
yield meaningful results. 243 Because the SEC categorizes
inconsistently, 244 I reviewed all enforcement actions and recoded a
handful that were improperly categorized. 245
Table 5 below reports the SEC’s success by type of forum and subject
matter category for the dataset labeled as Substantive Disposition in
regressions reported in section II.C.3. The data includes dispositions by
a third-party adjudicator after trial, on motion for summary judgment or
summary disposition, and after a defendant’s motion to dismiss filed
over the SEC’s objection. Table 5 does not include voluntary
dismissals. 246 The Table suggests that the SEC’s overall success rate is
marginally greater before ALJs than in court but the difference is not
statistically significant. What really makes a difference in the likelihood
of success is the subject matter of the charged violation.247 The SEC
loses more than 40% of contested insider trading actions and almost
243. Three cases involve transfer agents, two are miscellaneous, two involve municipal offering,
and one involves the FCPA. In a separate set of regressions, I coded these eight cases for the
categories to which they were closest. For example, as the SEC used to do in years past, I coded the
FCPA case as an issuer disclosure case and the three transfer agent cases as investment adviser
cases. I then re-ran all regressions and the results were essentially the same.
244. See Velikonja, supra note 134, at 954–57.
245. All stop orders were categorized as “Securities Offering.” All 12(j) actions were coded as
“Delinquent Filing” and excluded from the analysis. Contempt proceedings were coded as such and
excluded from the analysis. In all, four contested actions were recoded or removed from the sample.
246. A table of success rates by case category that includes voluntary dismissals by SEC motion
is included in the Appendix.
247. As noted above in section II.C.3.a, the difference is statistically significant.
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30% of contested accounting fraud actions, but less than 10% of other
actions. Since insider trading and accounting fraud cases are
overwhelmingly filed in court, the SEC’s track record in court looks
worse than its record before ALJs.
Table 5:
Summary of SEC Success by Case Category 248
SEC
win
Overall 249

Yes
No
Issuer
Yes
Reporting
No
BrokerYes
Dealer
No
Investment
Yes
Adviser
No
Market
Yes
Manipulation No
Securities
Yes
Offering
No

Number and win rate by category
Court
SEC
AP SEC
win %
win %
452
87.8% 150 89.8%
63
17
35
68.6% 14 77.8%
16
4
23
95.8% 53 88.3%
1
7
54
94.7% 47 90.4%
3
5
54
94.7% 3
100%
3
0
246
95.3% 21 100%
12
0

Total Overall
SEC win
rate
602 88.3%
80
49
71.0%
20
76
90.5%
8
101 92.7%
8
57
95.0%
3
267 95.7%
12

The cases decided by district court judges and ALJs were otherwise
similar along several dimensions. The median fine against a firm was
zero in both venues and the median fine against an individual was
around $200,000. Average fines and fines at the 75th percentile were
larger in court, pushed up by securities offering cases.250 Almost 80% of
cases resolved by a judge found the defendant to have violated scienterbased provisions of securities laws; fewer than 50% of cases before
ALJs found the defendant to have violated scienter-based provisions of
248. Table 5 reports outcomes in cases decided by a judge (or jury) or an ALJ at any stage. It
includes cases decided after a trial, by summary judgment or dismissal over the SEC’s objection. As
noted above in section II.C.3.a, the difference is not statistically significant.
249. The Overall numbers include three transfer agent actions filed in AP, two municipal
securities actions filed in court, one miscellaneous action filed in court and one in AP, and one
FCPA action filed in court.
250. The Table includes dispositions at the motion to dismiss (not by consent), summary
judgment, and trial stages (i.e., the same as Substantive Disposition dataset in Part II.C.3). The
Table includes all actions filed in FY 2007–15 and resolved by September 15, 2016.
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securities laws. On the other hand, almost 80% of defendants sued
before ALJs were barred from the securities industry or from practicing
before the Commission, whereas fewer than half of defendants sued in
court were ultimately barred. 251
3.

Regression Results

Using the predictors described above, the analysis reported in this section
tests whether the SEC’s likelihood of prevailing is significantly associated
with where the action is litigated. The analysis includes controls for case
category, the identity of the defendant (individual or firm), and whether the
action was based on a criminal prosecution or accompanied by a parallel
criminal action. 252
Table 6 below reports regression coefficients and measures of significance
for four different data sets: the first, Substantive Disposition, includes all
actions decided by a third-party adjudicator after trial, by summary
disposition, or by motion to dismiss issued over the SEC’s objection. The
regression dubbed Trial includes only actions decided after a full trial and
does not include dismissals or summary dispositions. The data analyzed in the
Trial regression are the most similar to the data that the Wall Street Journal
relied on to claim that a disparity in outcomes exists. The difference is that the
Wall Street Journal collected information on outcomes in all cases decided
between 2010 and 2015, regardless of when the cases were initially filed,
whereas the results below include only cases filed between 2007 and 2015
and decided by September 15, 2016.
The final regressions labeled Expanded include all actions included in the
Substantive Disposition model, as well as voluntary dismissals where the SEC
moved to dismiss its case against the defendant because its case was weak
(based on contemporaneous statements or news stories). 253 These regressions
measure the SEC’s likelihood of prevailing depending on the forum in which
the action is filed. Importantly, because they include voluntary dismissals by
SEC motion, the regression models labeled Expanded do not measure
whether ALJs are more likely to rule for the SEC than courts.
As already noted, all regressions include cases that were filed in fiscal
years 2007 to 2015 and were decided by September 15, 2016. For actions
251. I searched for follow-on proceedings targeting defendants sued in court. The count likely
understates the share of court defendants facing bars because the SEC can take some time to initiate
follow-on proceedings after successful litigation in court.
252. In unreported regressions, I also controlled for the year in which the case was filed and the
SEC Chair. Neither of the variables was statistically significant.
253. In addition, they include dismissals where no information on the reason for dismissal was
available.
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filed in FY 2013 and later, more than ten percent of the cases filed in court
remain ongoing, which could bias the result. 254 To mitigate against the risk
that defendants who litigate longer are more likely to prevail against the SEC,
I also report regression coefficients based on the Expanded dataset including
only cases filed in FY 2007 to 2012.255
Table 6:
Logistic Regression Coefficients 256

ALJa
Log odds
Wald (df=1)
Odds ratio
Firm
Log odds
Wald (df=1)
Odds ratio
Based on Criminal
Log odds
Wald (df=1)
Odds ratio
Parallel Criminal a
Log odds
Wald (df=1)
Odds ratio

Substantive Trials
Disposition
2007–15
2007–15

Expanded
(incl. voluntary dismissal)
2007–15 2007–12

0.22
0.33
1.25

0.44
0.99
1.55

0.79*
5.01
2.20

0.76
2.52
2.13

1.70**
13.89
5.48

1.74**
7.67
5.73

1.50**
17.51
4.48

1.55**
14.64
4.71

1.87**
8.35
6.48

2.34**
15.94
10.43

2.37**
13.96
10.69

-0.54
1.57
0.58

-0.62†
2.81
0.54

-0.71†
2.71
-0.49

254. Many of the cases that are ongoing are stayed pending the resolution of the parallel criminal
case. As a result, it is not likely that the cases still pending are the ones the SEC is more likely to
lose. If anything, the opposite is likely true.
255. I also ran regressions using only cases filed in FY 2007 to 2012 in the Substantive
Disposition and Trials datasets, and the results were similar to those reported for the full dataset:
predictor Court was not significant in any model whereas other predictors were either significant or
not, and with the same signal.
256. The dependent variable is whether SEC won on at least one of the counts (SEC win is coded
as 1). The variable ALJ codes actions decided by ALJ as 1 and by court as 0. The variable Firm
codes actions against firms as 1 and against individuals as 0; the variable Based on Criminal codes
actions based on criminal convictions as 1. In variable Category, actions targeting securities offering
violations are coded as the baseline.
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Substantive Trials
Disposition
2007–15
2007–15
Category
68.06**
Wald (df=6)
20.74**
Securities Offering
0.0
Wald
n.a.
Odds ratio
Market Manipulation 2.93**
51.28
Wald
Odds ratio
2.90**
Investment Adviser
19.51
Wald
Odds ratio
2.22**
Broker Dealer
20.67
Wald
Odds ratio
2.06**
Issuer Reporting
14.95
Wald
Odds ratio
0.83*
Insider Trading
4.51
Wald
Odds ratio
0.297
Pseudo R2
682
N
**p<0.01; *p<0.05; †p<0.1

4.26
19.83†
0.0
n.a.
1.05†
2.97
2.85
1.04
1.43
2.83
0.98
2.16
2.66
0.99
2.35
2.68
0.47
0.66
1.61
0.150
290

359

Expanded
(incl. voluntary dismissal)
2007–15 2007–12
112.70**
1.52
1.74
4.59
1.70
1.80
5.50
0.69
0.35
1.99
0.18
0.024
1.12
-0.85
0.56
0.43
-1.87
2.68
0.15
0.403
728

98.29**
2.44†
3.76
11.42
2.52†
3.25
12.43
1.35
1.15
3.85
0.77
0.39
2.15
-0.51
0.18
0.60
-1.42
1.36
0.24
0.461
571

a

None of the dispositions at trial were based on a criminal conviction or plea, so the
predictor is not included in the regression analysis.

Table 6 reports for each predictor three statistics generated by the
logistic regression model. The first is a log odds coefficient, the second
the Wald statistic, and the third an odds ratio. The log odds coefficient is
a logarithmic measure of association between the response variable (i.e.,
SEC success) and the predictor. The Wald statistic is a measure of
statistical significance: it tells one whether the observed association is so
large that it is unlikely to appear by chance. The higher the Wald
statistic, the more likely that the observed association between the two
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variables is real. 257 The odds ratio is a more useful measure than the log
odds coefficient: it quantifies the association. It is a relative measure of
the effect, comparing the relative likelihood of success before an ALJ
with the relative likelihood of success in court. For example, an odds
ratio of 5.48 for the predictor Firm in the Substantive Disposition model
implies that the SEC is 5.48-times as likely to prevail against a firm than
against an individual defendant, all else being equal.
A positive log odds coefficient implies that the predictor and the
response variable are positively correlated; a negative number suggests a
negative correlation. All predictors used in the regression models are
categorical. Three—ALJ, Firm, and Based on Criminal—are binary,
where the observation takes on one of two values (i.e., ALJ or court,
individual or firm, convicted or not). For each of the predictors, one of
the options was chosen as the baseline. A logistic regression reports log
odds coefficients as compared with a baseline, so the choice of baseline
matters. 258 In the models reported above, the baseline value for the
predictor Firm was litigation against a firm. Thus, the reported log odds
coefficients measure the relationship between an SEC win in a case
against a firm as compared with litigation against an individual. A
positive coefficient suggests that the SEC is more likely to win against a
firm than against an individual defendant, all else being equal. Similarly,
the log odds coefficients in the regression model Trial for predictors
ALJ and Based on Criminal are positive; given the selected baselines
(litigation in court and no conviction, respectively), the SEC is more
likely to prevail in a case filed before an ALJ and in an action against a
defendant convicted for the same violation. The SEC is less likely to
prevail when the action is accompanied by a parallel criminal case; this
is what one might call the Newman effect. Many insider trading cases
are accompanied by, but not based on, criminal indictments that are later
dismissed.
The regression also includes the subject matter category as a fixed
effect. Category is a qualitative predictor. The subject matters for
enforcement actions are a finite set and there is no ordering between
classes: an action for insider trading is not better or worse than an action
for market manipulation. Cases categorized as “other” are used as the
baseline to compare against other types of cases.
257. See GARETH JAMES, DANIELA WITTEN, TREVOR HASTIE & ROBERT TIBSHIRANI, AN
INTRODUCTION TO STATISTICAL LEARNING 134 (2015).
258. It does not matter for the calculation which is chosen as the baseline; the baseline only
matters in interpretation and only because it determines whether the log odds coefficient is positive
or negative. See HASTIE, THIBSHIRANI & FRIEDMAN, supra note 241, at 119.
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As is common in studies reporting the results of a statistical analysis,
coefficients that are statistically significant are marked with asterisks. 259
Notably, in the models most similar to the results reported in the Wall
Street Journal, labeled Trials and Substantive Disposition, the variable
ALJ is not statistically significant. In other words, even though the log
odds coefficient for the predictor ALJ is positive in both models, the
result does not allow one to reject the null hypothesis that there is no
association between the type of forum in which an action is filed and
case outcome. Contrary to the claims advanced by the Wall Street
Journal, 260 the data analyzed do not support the conclusion that the SEC
is more likely to win at trial decided by an ALJ than in one decided by a
federal district judge once one controls for case category, the nature of
the defendant, and the existence of parallel criminal proceedings.
What matters in adjudicated cases is not where the case is litigated but
whether the targeted defendant is an individual and, to a lesser extent,
what type of violation is charged. 261 The SEC is significantly less likely
to prevail against individual defendants and against defendants targeted
for insider trading and issuer reporting. 262
The only model in which the type of forum is significantly associated
with case outcomes is the third model labeled Expanded. Both the third
and fourth columns include voluntary dismissals by the SEC. In the
Expanded model that includes all contested cases filed between 2007
and 2015, the variable ALJ is statistically significant at p<0.05. 263
Holding other predictors constant, the SEC is statistically significantly
more likely to win on at least one count when the case is filed in the
administrative forum.
Even this result should be taken with reservations. Venue does not
matter for cases decided by a judge or an ALJ; it is only significant when
voluntary dismissals are included. This requires two additional caveats.

259. One asterisk signals that the result is significant at p<0.05, which means that there is less
than a 5% chance that there is no relationship between the response (SEC win) and the predictor
(e.g., litigation in court). Two asterisks signal that the result is significant at p<0.01, which implies
that there is less than a 1% chance that there is no relationship between the response and the
predictor.
260. See Eaglesham, supra note 14; Eaglesham, supra note 114.
261. Using odds ratios reported in Table 6, the SEC is more than five times more likely to win
when the defendant is a firm than when the defendant is an individual.
262. Using odds ratios reported in Table 6, compared with securities offering cases, the SEC is
seventeen times less likely to prevail on a dispositive motion in insider trading cases and eight-times
less likely to prevail in issuer reporting cases.
263. Note that if cases filed in FY 2012 are included as well, the variable Court is not statistically
significant.
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First, for many voluntary dismissals, conclusive contemporaneous
evidence on why the case was dismissed is not available. When in doubt,
the voluntary dismissal was coded as a defendant win. 264 To the extent
some of these were not true wins, the result could be entirely due to
coding error. 265 Second, the venue is not significant when cases filed
after 2012 are excluded. Although the coefficients do not change much,
the power of the test declines with a smaller sample.
This result remains unchanged in unreported models using fixed
effects for the year in which the action was filed and for the SEC chair.
In other words, individuals targeted in insider trading and issuer
reporting actions are consistently more likely than other defendants to
prevail against the SEC. Defendants convicted of crimes are
significantly less likely to prevail against the SEC. The SEC has
consistently filed cases for insider trading and issuers reporting in court.
Contrary to the oft-repeated claims of statistical disparity, these results
do not support the conclusion that defendants are more likely to win at
trial in court than before ALJs, nor do they suggest that judges are more
likely to rule for defendants than are ALJs. The analysis does suggest a
possibility that defendants might fare better when the SEC targets them
in court than before ALJs, but only if the SEC dismisses the case
voluntarily, not if the case goes to a decision by a judge or an ALJ.
III. INTERPRETING THE RESULTS
The statistical analysis reported in Part II suggests that the Wall Street
Journal’s data on which many advocates of reform have relied cannot be
used to support the claim that the SEC is more likely to prevail when it
litigates before ALJs. At the same time, the findings reported in this
Article do not suggest that the type of forum is irrelevant. The SEC’s
expanded jurisdiction is new and too many of the post-Dodd-Frank cases
are still ongoing, so none of the regressions validly test only post-DoddFrank data.
The gold standard in empirical studies is a double-blind randomized
controlled experiment. Such experiments divide the sample into two
groups that are similar along relevant dimensions, randomly assign one
group to treatment (in this case, adjudication by ALJ), and observe
whether treatment is correlated with different outcomes as compared
264. This includes about half of voluntary dismissals coded as defendant wins.
265. I ran a robustness check where the twenty voluntary dismissals without available evidence as
to why they were dismissed were excluded from the model. The result was not statistically
significant (log odds = 0.52; Wald = 2.06; odds ratio = 1.69).
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with the control group. 266 Unfortunately, a double-blind study of
outcomes in securities enforcement actions based on the type of forum is
impossible because the SEC, as well as the ALJ or the judge deciding
the case, know that the SEC chose to file the case in their forum.
And so, evidence of disparities must come from an observational
study like the one printed in the Wall Street Journal and the one reported
in this Article. Carefully designed observational studies can be used to
identify significant associations between variables of interest, but trained
statisticians caution users from drawing causal inferences based on
observational studies.
This Article has catalogued the many problems with the Wall Street
Journal’s report. But the empirical analysis in Part II, too, has significant
limitations. This Part discusses two limitations: omitted variable bias
and selection bias. It concludes with recommendations for further
research.
A.

The Missing Pieces: Omitted Variables and Selection Bias

The conclusion offered in section II.C.3 that the type of forum does
not matter assumes that the included predictors capture the relevant
characteristics of cases filed in either forum. If so, there is no robust
statistically significant association between the forum in which an SEC
enforcement action is litigated and the defendant’s success against the
SEC.
This assumption is certainly not satisfied. The regression models
reported above omit important variables. Representation might matter:
pro se defendants may be more likely to lose than those represented by
counsel, in particular if counsel is experienced.267 The ALJ or federal
judge deciding the case might matter, or the SEC regional office that
conducted the investigation. One could collect more data, but none of
this is likely to be worth the effort because the two most important
characteristics that are omitted, case quality and the SEC’s perception of
case quality, are either not easily measured or are not observable.
The type of forum where the case is litigated is not random. The SEC
selects which cases to litigate in court and which ones to file in the
administrative forum, so selection bias is a significant concern. It is
possible that the SEC files in the administrative forum cases that it
266. See John Concato, Nirav Shah & Ralph I. Horwitz, Randomized, Controlled Trials,
Observational Studies, and the Hierarchy of Research Designs, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1887 (2000)
(demonstrating the superiority of randomized double blind control trials over observational studies).
267. See Zaring, supra note 20, at 1179 tbl.1.
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believes it could not win in court—the charge lobbed by the Wall Street
Journal. 268 If so, one would expect the SEC to win less often before
ALJs than in court, assuming all else is equal.269 Then, the finding of no
disparity in success rates between the two different forums would be
significant and important. It would suggest that the proverbial deck is
stacked in favor of the SEC in administrative proceedings. 270
Unfortunately, the complaints and the OIPs do not supply enough
information to code consistently for case quality, and the cases where
consistent coding could be possible, such as insider trading, are virtually
all filed in court. External proxies, such as stock price movement on
announcement of detected violation, 271 could be useful as a measure of
the seriousness of the violation. But, stock-price data is limited to public
firms, which represent only four percent of SEC enforcement actions
and an even smaller slice of contested actions, 272 so it is not useful as a
general measure of case quality. Moreover, if the concern is the SEC’s
opportunistic forum selection, then we would need a variable to measure
the enforcement staff’s perception of case quality. Unfortunately, that,
too, is not observable at present.
There is a second selection bias effect that renders win ratios of
limited value in assessing the fairness of SEC enforcement. Despite the
interest in litigated cases, it is far more common for defendants to settle
with the SEC. Over the period studied, about 40% of cases were filed as
settled actions, and another 35% were settled during the proceedings. 273
But the ratio of settled cases from initiation is not stable. During the
study period, the rate varied from a low of 32% in FY 2009 to a high of
48% in FY 2014. If the odds that a case will settle before the SEC files
an enforcement action have changed, the proportion and thus the mix of
cases that are contested has changed, too. In addition, the relative shares
268. See Eaglesham, supra note 14.
269. That is, assuming that success rates for like cases are the same in court and before ALJs.
270. Alternately, it is also possible that the SEC files easier cases or cases that it is ex ante more
likely to win in the administrative forum. In that case, the finding of no disparity would suggest that
ALJs are biased against the SEC.
271. See Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., Proxies and Databases in Financial Misconduct Research
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2112569 [https://
perma.cc/ZPG6-8KEA] (discussing the use of stock market information in studies of financial
misreporting).
272. See STEPHEN CHOI, SARA E. GILLEY, AND DAVID F. MARCUS, NYU POLLACK CTR. FOR
LAW & BUS. AND CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SEC ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY AGAINST PUBLIC
COMPANY DEFENDANTS, FISCAL YEARS 2010–2015, at 2 (2016), http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/
default/files/SEC-Enforcement-Activity-FY2010-FY2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/4EJE-MVNB].
273. The ratio for settled cases is based on cases that have been resolved and does not include
ongoing cases. See discussion supra section II.C.1.
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of settled actions filed in different venues have not remained stable.
Fewer of the cases filed in court are filed as settled cases: 30% in FY
2007 and 15% in FY 2015. On the other hand, the relative share of cases
filed as settled in the administrative forum has remained stable at
80%. 274
Defendants’ willingness to settle may be affected by their perception
that ALJs are less fair. 275 The SEC has reportedly threatened
investigated parties with litigation before ALJs if they are unwilling to
settle. 276 As a result, more parties might be settling post-Dodd-Frank
than before and thus the types of cases that are adjudicated and the
forum in which they are adjudicated have changed. At the same time, at
least some defendants’ willingness to settle may have declined after the
Wall Street Journal’s reporting. 277 As some defendants have succeeded
in lawsuits seeking to enjoin administrative proceedings, others may
have been encouraged to contest charges instead of settling. If the types
of cases that are contested keep changing, any long-term analysis of case
outcomes is problematic unless we could capture relevant characteristics
to control for such changes.
The SEC’s enforcement practices, too, have changed over time.
Between 2007 and 2015, the SEC lived through three Chairs with vastly
different priorities and underwent a serious restructuring of its
Enforcement Division. 278 The restructuring reportedly improved the
morale of employees; it also changed the level of enforcement
activity. 279 Finally, the SEC has changed where it files contested
cases. 280 While absolute numbers are a single figure, success rate is a
ratio comprised of two numbers: the numerator and the denominator.
274. There was a decline in 2012 and 2013 to 61% and 65%, respectively. Data on file with
author.
275. See Brian Mahoney, SEC Could Bring More Insider Trading Cases In-House, LAW360
(June 11, 2014, 6:53 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/547183/sec-couldbring-more-insidertrading-cases-in-house [https://perma.cc/V7V8-8TVQ].
276. See id. (quoting SEC Enforcement Director Ceresney as saying the SEC “threatened
administrative proceedings” and the defendant settled).
277. This can be true even if the overall settlement rate increased. Since 2013, the SEC has
brought a considerable number of sweeps targeting large groups of defendants for similar violations.
Such defendants invariably settle, which increases both the numerator and the denominator to
calculate the ratio of cases that are filed as settled actions. A settlement ratio that includes sweeps
can mask the fact that defendants other than those targeted in sweeps are less likely to settle.
278. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-358, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION: GREATER ATTENTION NEEDED TO ENHANCE COMMUNICATION AND UTILIZATION OF
RESOURCES IN THE DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT (2009).
279. See id.
280. See Eaglesham, supra note 122.
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One can change the success rate by changing either the number of cases
brought, the number of successes, or both. As such, success rates are
more vulnerable to small changes in inputs and the biases discussed
above.
All of these factors suggest that success rates are not a useful measure
of fairness in SEC enforcement. It is unfortunate that they have become
one, and even more unfortunate that the Wall Street Journal report that
stirred the controversy was done so poorly and over-claimed so
extensively.
B.

Beyond the Empirics

The Wall Street Journal’s report can serve as a useful cautionary tale.
It combined bold claims and seemingly straightforward data analysis to
make the case that the SEC was treating defendants unfairly. It
confirmed the perceptions that the SEC was a sore loser and was
changing the rules of the game to ensure it would win in the future.
The perception that ALJs supply a lesser form of fairness is likely to
persist. 281 After the analysis offered in this Article, one would hope that
better-researched and supported empirical analyses will replace news
stories in the ongoing debate about the fairness of the administrative
forum. Because empirical evidence is lacking, the debate about the
fairness of administrative adjudication and the appropriate remedies
should be held on the policy merits and demerits. There are good and
bad arguments advanced by both the SEC and its critics. What the
battling sides hopefully will accept is that the data in this debate is no
trump card.
The ultimate result might be that the SEC amends procedural rules
before ALJs again to model them more closely on the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, as some commentators have proposed. 282 It might be to
enable courts to decide what forum is most appropriate to resolve an
SEC enforcement action. 283 But that is unlikely to satisfy everyone. Both
281. See, e.g., McLucas & Martens, supra note 6, at A17 (“Democratic self-governance requires
that the governed be generally convinced of the system’s evenhandedness. We are concerned that
the SEC is damaging the perceived legitimacy of how the agency uses its enforcement power.”);
Michael S. Piwowar, Comm’r, SEC, Remarks at the “SEC Speaks” Conference 2015: A Fair,
Orderly and Efficient SEC (Feb. 20, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/022015spchcmsp.html [https://perma.cc/RT5C-F6P7] (“To avoid the perception that the Commission is
taking its tougher cases to its in-house judges, and to ensure that all are treated fairly and equally,
the Commission should set out and implement guidelines for determining which cases are brought
in administrative proceedings and which in federal courts.”).
282. See, e.g., Bondi, Ortiz & Wheatley, supra note 29; Zornow, supra note 132.
283. See Grundfest, supra note 30.
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bills introduced in Congress include removal provisions that would
entitle defendants to remove any action to federal district court and raise
the burden of persuasion if the case were to stay in the administrative
forum. 284 Practitioners have proposed that the Commission “bring all but
its most routine cases in federal court.” 285
These proposals are associated with significant costs that could
surpass any purported benefits. 286 Removing most cases to court would
increase the workload for and stress the already overburdened federal
judiciary 287 without meaningfully improving either defendants’
procedural protections or their likelihood of success. Giving defendants
the incentive to remove cases to court would drain the SEC’s resources,
thus reducing overall enforcement levels unless Congress were to
appropriate additional funds. In addition, in-court adjudication could
introduce errors as well. Complex regulatory matters may be beyond the
capacity of even the most dedicated layperson jurors, and so removing
securities enforcement actions to the courts could reduce the
predictability of outcomes. 288 On the other hand, unsettled legal
questions are perhaps better left to federal judges. The choice of forum
involves trade-offs, and no single type of forum is best for all types of
disputes brought by a regulator with broad enforcement authority such as
the SEC.
CONCLUSION
It is hardly news that a news story got an important fact wrong. The
Wall Street Journal’s story is unusual in the significant influence that it
has had on the law and the practice of securities enforcement. Many of
the power players in securities regulation have referenced the alleged
disparity, including judges deciding securities cases, a sitting SEC
Commissioner, and congressmen advancing statutory amendments. The
reported disparity led the SEC itself to amend its Rules of Practice.
Despite the effort, the SEC’s administrative adjudication continues to

284. See discussion supra notes 126–30 and accompanying text.
285. Brune, supra note 29, at 5.
286. See Grundfest, supra note 30, at 1184.
287. See Peter J. Henning, Reforming the SEC’s Administrative Process, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/27/business/dealbook/reforming-the-secs-administrativeprocess.html [https://perma.cc/8S9Z-RR56] (speculating that more cases would be filed in court).
288. See generally Davison et al., supra note 22, at 104 (observing that complex issues can be
“outside the experience and understanding of a typical layperson jury”).
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face scrutiny. This is a remarkable feat for any empirical study, let alone
a seriously deficient one.
This Article offers a more careful and comprehensive alternative
analysis of SEC success rates. It reports that there is no robust
correlation between the selected forum and case outcome. This finding
does not imply that the type of forum in which the SEC litigates does not
matter. Rather, there are significant empirical obstacles to finding any
useful results by comparing case outcomes.
The controversy about the fairness of SEC enforcement in the
administrative forum will no doubt continue. By discrediting the data
that many of the SEC’s critics have used to buttress their claims, this
Article hopes that the debate can proceed at a lower volume and offer
more measured solutions than some of the proposals advanced thus far.
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APPENDIX
Table 7:
Success by Case Category,
Including Voluntary Dismissals (Expanded)
SEC Number and win rate by category
win Court SEC
AP
SEC
win %
win %
Overall
Yes 451
80.5% 150 89.3%
No 109
18
Insider
Yes 38
40.9% 2
50.0%
Trading
No 55
2
Issuer
Yes 35
56.5% 14
77.8%
Reporting
No 27
4
BrokerYes 23
85.2% 53
88.3%
Dealer
No 4
7
Investment
Yes 54
93.1% 47
90.4%
Adviser
No 4
5
Market
Yes 54
94.7% 3
100%
Manipulation No 3
0
Securities
Yes 246
94.3% 21
100%
Offering
No 15
0

Total

601
127
40
57
49
31
76
11
101
9
57
3
267
15

Overall
SEC win
rate
82.6%
41.2%
61.1%
87.4%
91.2%
95.0%
94.7%
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Table 8:
Success by Case Category after Trial or ALJ Initial Decision289
SEC Number and win rate by category
win Court SEC
AP
SEC
win %
win %
Overall
Yes 105
82.7% 146 89.6%
No 22
17
Insider
Yes 22
73.3% 2
66.7%
Trading
No 8
1
Issuer
Yes 18
81.8% 14
77.8%
Reporting
No 4
4
BrokerYes 9
90.0% 53
88.3%
Dealer
No 1
7
Investment
Yes 11
91.7% 43
89.6%
Adviser
No 1
5
Market
Yes 11
84.6% 3
100%
Manipulation No 2
0
Securities
Yes 34
85.0% 19
100%
Offering
No 6
0

Total

251
39
24
9
32
8
62
8
54
6
14
2
53
6

Overall
SEC win
rate
86.6%
72.7%
80.0%
88.6%
90.0%
87.5%
89.8%

289. The Table includes dispositions after jury or bench trial for cases filed in court and
dispositions of ALJ initial decision after a hearing (not including cases decided by default) (i.e., the
same as Reduced dataset in section II.C.3).

